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Jurisdiction 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(j), which gives this Court jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and 
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction"; and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3, which generally does 
not give the Court of Appeals original appellate jurisdiction over civil matters 
originating in the district court which are neither administrative nor domestic. 
Issues Presented on Appeal 
Is an action for back wages under the Utah Payment of Wages act, Utah Code 
Ann. Title 34, Ch. 28 (hereinafter referred to as the "UPW"), an action for the same 
loss as an action for back wages and overtime under the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 USC §201, et. seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "FLSA")? 
If a separate federal action is recognized, is an employee who is also a pro 
se attorney entitled to attorney's fees under 29 USC §216(b)? 
If a separate federal action is recognized, is an employee entitled to 
liquidated damages under 29 USC §216(b)? The employee seeks an award of 
liquidated damages in the sum of $3,544.80 pursuant to that section. 
May an employee who is also a pro se attorney have his right to attorney's 
fees under Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 be extinguished on equitable principles? The 
appellant also seeks attorney's fees for this appeal. 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate 
court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below. And in 
determining whether those facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment 
for the prevailing party below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v State, 779 P2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
Determinative Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §34-28-2(2) provides: 
The word "wages" means all amounts due the employee for 
labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a 
time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating 
such amount. 
Copies of Utah Code Unann., Vol. 2, pages 266 and 267 (1989), which includes 
the full language of §§34-26-4 to 34-28-8 and copies of Utah Code Unann. Vol. 4, 
pages 666 and 667 (1989), which include the full language of Rule 4-505, R. Jud. 
Admin., are included in Appellant's addendum. 
29 USC §207(a)(l) provides in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ 
any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours 
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in 
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and 
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
29 USC §216(b) provides in pertinent part: 
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of 
this Act [29 USC §§ 206 or 207] shall be liable to the employee or 
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or 
their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an 
additional equal amount as liquidated damages. . . . The court in such 
action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorneyfs fee to be paid by the 
defendant, and costs of the action. 
The full language of 29 USCS §§206, 207, 216, and 260, with amendments, are 
included in Appellant's addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 provides: 
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant, or other 
employee shall have cause to bring suit for wages earned and due 
according to the terms of his employment and shall establish by the 
decision of the court that the amount for which he has brought suit is 
justly due, and that a demand has been made in writing at least 
fifteen days before suit was brought for a sum not to exceed the 
amount so found due, then it shall be the duty of the court before 
which the case shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff a reasonable 
attorneys* fee in addition to the amount found due for wages, to be 
taxed as costs of suit. 
Statement of the Case 
Smith brought an action against his former employers for back wages and 
overtime under both state and federal law. Defendants answered, but failed to 
timely responded to Smith's discovery or meaningfully oppose Smith's motion for 
summary judgment. Summary judgment partially granting Smith's state claim and 
completely denying Smith's federal claim was given in the Second Judicial District 
Court for Davis County, Judge Douglas Cornaby presiding. The denials were based 
upon conclusions of law with no factual issues remaining to be determined by trial. 
Defendants' subsequent motions, including one to set aside judgment, were denied. 
Relevant Facts 
This statement of facts assumes that Smith's requests for admissions were 
deemed admitted by defendants pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a) and that Smith's 
statement of material facts in his motion for summary judgment were deemed 
admitted pursuant to Rule 4-501(5), R. Jud. Admin. A Copy of Smith's uncontro-
verted statement of material facts from his memorandum of points and authorities 
in support of motion for summary judgment and motion for order compelling 
discovery from defendants are included in Appellant's addendum. 
Stephen Smith was hired in March, 1989 by Larry Peterman to do computer 
work for Movie Buffs, a dba for Janae Kingston, Mr. Peterman's wife, with stores 
in Utah and Wyoming (Index pg. 87, U5; pg. 89, 1JH27-30). Dorothy Batchelor, Ms. 
Kingston's mother, acted as the personnel manager of the business (Index Pg. 89, 
1130-31). Smith is also a licensed attorney who provided some legal services to 
Movie Buffs during his employment (Index pg. 87, 1111 9, 11, & 13). 
A wage dispute between the parties resulted in Smithfs termination of his 
employment and subsequent written demands for overtime compensation and back 
wages in August, 1989 for the sum of $2,657.95 (Index pp. 35-41). Other than a 
check for one week's wages in the sum of $190.28 (Index pg. 26, 1114), Smith 
received no written reply to his demands, resulting in this action being filed by 
Smith pro se on September 20, 1989. 
Smith claimed in his complaint (Index pp. 1-4), and submitted unopposed 
evidence to the court (Index pp. 23-84), that he was due the sum of $3,544.80 in 
back wages, comprised of 22.05 regular hours and 188.15 overtime hours (Index pg. 
3, U13) based upon an hourly wage of $11.65 per hour (Index pg. 3,118; pg. 88, 111119-
24). Smith also sought a $4,000.00 penalty provided for under Utah Code Ann. §34-
28-5(2), liquidated damages equal to the amount sought in back wages and overtime 
under the FLSA, and attorney's fees for his time expended as an attorney in pursuing 
this matter under both Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 and the FLSA (Index pp. 3-4). 
Defendants answered (Index pg. 11-17), denying any obligation to Smith and 
raising the defense that Smith was salaried administrative personnel exempt from 
application of the FLSA, who provided most of his services to Movie Buffs as an 
attorney (Index pg. 11). The affirmative defenses of waiver, laches, and estoppel 
were also generally raised (Index pg. 16). 
Discovery was commenced by Smith by mail on October 6, 1989 for each 
defendant, with certificates of service filed with the Court on October 10, 1989 
(Index pp. 18-20). The packages included requests for admissions, interrogatories, 
and requests for production of documents (Index pp. 42-79). Corrections to the 
discovery requested were also mailed by letters on October 6, 1989 (Index pg. 80) 
and October 12, 1989 (Index pg. 81). The October 12 letter contained the following 
language omitted from Smith's discovery requests: "please be advised that, pursuant 
to rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded 
to within 30 days after service of the request or within such shorter or longer times 
as the court may allow." 
Smith moved for summary judgment on November 15, 1989 (Index pp. 21-22), 
basing his motion upon various exhibits, his affidavit (Index pp. 23-84), and the 
assertion that the requests for admission were now deemed admitted (Index pp. 89-
90). Smith filed an affidavits for attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 4-505, R. Jud. 
Admin. (Index pp. 23-29). Certificates of service of defendants' answers to 
discovery were filed on December 1, 1989 (Index pp. 95-100) and an objection to 
motion for summary judgment was filed with the court on December 7, 1989 (Index 
pp. 101-102). The objection did not controvert Smith's statement of material facts. 
On December 13, 1989, without hearing, Smith's motion was granted as to the 
claim for $3,544.80 in back wages and for the $4,000.00 penalty provided by Utah 
Code Ann. §34-28-5(2). While acknowledging that Smith had stated a claim under 
Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 for attorneys fees, the motion was denied in equity. The 
federal FLSA claims were denied as a claim for the same loss under state law. 
Defendants' requests for admissions were deemed admitted (Index pp. 115-116). An 
order of judgment conforming to the ruling was signed and entered on January 16, 
1990 (Index pp. 118-121). A Copy of the order is included in Appellant's Addendum. 
On January 19, 1990 defendants filed their motion to set aside the judgment 
granted on December 13, 1989 and for permission to withdraw or amend their 
admissions, supported by an affidavit of counsel and a memoranda (Index pp. 122-
133). Smith's reply was filed on February 5, 1990 (Index pp. 134-138) and the matter 
was submitted for decision without hearing. A signed order denying defendants' 
motion was entered on February 27, 1990 (Index pg. 143-145). 
Smith filed an amended notice of appeal to the Supreme Court on March 28, 
1990 (Index pp. 152-153). Defendants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of 
Appeals on March 29, 1990 (Index pg. 155) and a notice of cross-appeal to the 
Supreme Court on May 8, 1990. 
Summary of Arguments 
The UPW addresses the failure of the employer to pay wages to the employee 
at regular intervals or promptly upon termination. The FLSA is directed to the 
different concern that the employee be paid certain minimum compensation and 
additional compensation for work performed in addition to the normal work week. 
Smith is not attempting to recover twice for the same loss of wages. But Smith is 
asserting that an employer who fails to pay overtime compensation and who 
subsequently fails to pay at all is subject to both of the penalties provided by the 
two separate and distinct statutes. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an award of liquidated 
damages pursuant to 29 USC §216(b) is mandatory upon the courts. Overnight Motor 
Transp. Co. v Missal, 316 US 572, 86 L Ed 1682, 62 S Ct 1216, reh den 317 US 706, 
87 L Ed 563, 63 S Ct 76 (1942). This is now subject to the employer's evidence of 
his good faith under 29 USC §260, which was subsequently enacted in 1947. No 
evidence of good faith was presented by defendants, rendering 29 USC §260 
inapplicable to this case. 
An award of attorneys fees under 29 USC §216(b) is mandatory, Birbalas v 
Cuneo Printing Industries, Inc., 140 F2d 826 (CA7 111 1944), Whittington v Roberts, 
360 F Supp 335 (DC Miss 1973). Although a pro se action by a practicing attorney 
for relief under the FLSA is novel to appellants knowledge, the preponderance of 
federal decisions allow a pro se attorney an award of attorneys fees where otherwise 
provided for by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 directs an award of attorney's fees under the facts 
of this case, which was acknowledged by the district court. "Furthermore, contrary 
to appellant's contention that attorneys fees should be determined on the basis of 
an equitable standard, attorneys fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are awarded 
as a matter of legal right." Cabrera v Cottrell, 694 P2d 622, at 623 (Utah 1985). 
The language of the statute and the preponderance of states deciding the matter 
have allowed attorneys fees to pro se attorneys who are otherwise entitled to an 
award of fees. 
Argument 
Actions Under The State & Federal Laws Are Not For The Same Loss 
Under the Supremacy clause of Article VI of the Constitution of the United 
States, the FLSA supersedes the UPW to the extent of any inconsistency, Butte 
Miners' Union v Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 118 P2d 148 (Mont 1941), Elkins v 
Showcase, Inc., 704 P2d 977 (Kan 1985); but no inconsistency exists. The FLSA has 
not pre-empted state regulation nor the imposition of state remedies for violations 
arising out of the same circumstances, Davis v Jobs for Progress, Inc., 427 F Supp 
479 (DC Ariz 1976). 
The UPW makes no reference to overtime wages, defining only "wages" under 
Utah Code Ann. §34-28-2(2) as generally "...amounts due the employee for labor or 
services...". §7(a)(l) of the FLSA, 29 USC §207(a)(l), establishes overtime wages at 
"...one and one-half times the regular rate...". Nowhere do the two statutes make 
reference to each other. It is logically inconsistent that Smith could be awarded the 
full amount prayed for back wages without implicitly awarding Smith the value 
established by federal law for the overtime hours claimed. 
The penalty provisions of the federal and state statutes address different 
concerns. 29 USC §216(b) awards liquidated damages and attorney's fees against an 
employer who fails to pay the minimum and overtime wages required by the FLSA. 
An employee does not have to terminate his employment in order to bring an action 
under the FLSA. In contrast, the 60 days wages penalty of Utah Code Ann. §34-28-
5(2) only applies "[wjhenever an employer separates an employee from his payroll..." 
under Utah Code Ann. §34-28-5(1). It addresses the employer's delay in the payment 
of the employee's wages at termination. The amount of wages due at termination 
must then be determined by reference to the employment agreement between the 
employer and the employee as modified to the extent required by the FLSA. Each 
statute has its own distinct elements to be plead and proved. 
Smith not only lost his uncompensated overtime wages, he also lost the 
prompt payment of his wages, including regular wages, when his employment was 
terminated. 
Where the complaint alleges a violation by the defendant in failing to pay 
overtime compensation, the trial court errs in failing to make findings on the issue, 
Tobin v Anthony-Williams Mfg. Co., 196 F2d 547 (CA8 Ark 1952). 
Liquidated Damages are Mandatory 
The liquidated damages provision of 29 USC §216(b) was determined to be 
mandatory by the Supreme Court in Overnight, supra. However, in 1947, Congress 
enacted 29 USC §260 to address more specifically the liquidated damages provision 
of 29 USC §216(b), allowing the employer to show to the satisfaction of the court 
"...that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he 
had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation..." 
of the FLSA. 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the discretion of the court 
in awarding liquidated damages under 29 USC §260 is invoked only if the employer 
carries the burden of showing both that he acted in good faith and that he had 
reasonable grounds for believing that he had not violated the Act, and that the trial 
courts errs in refusing to award liquidated damages where it makes no finding that 
the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that it had complied with the 
Act. Sinclair v Automobile Club of Oklahoma, Inc., 733 F2d 726 (CA10 Okla 1984). 
The 10th Circuit held in the companion case that proof of the employer's good faith 
is a prerequisite for the exercise of the court's discretion under 29 USC §260. Doty 
vElias, 733 F2d 720 (CA10 Okla 1984). See also Liquidated Damages for Violations 
of Wage and Hour Provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 ALR Fed 607. Where 
no evidence was submitted by defendants, Smith must be awarded liquidated 
damages. 
Attorney's Fees Under Federal Law 
Questions concerning the fixing of reasonable attorney's fees in actions 
brought under 29 USC §216(b) are governed exclusively by federal law, Eakin v 
Ascension Parish Police Jury, 294 So2d 527 (La 1974). These fees are an integral 
part of the employeefs recovery and cannot be considered as "costs™ incident to 
recovery, Caperna v Williams-Bauer Corp., 185 Misc 687, 57 NYS2d 254, aff'd 186 
Misc 27, 58 NYS2d 876 (NY 1945), J. F. Schneider & Son, Inc. v Justice, 293 Ky 126, 
168 SW2d 591 (Ky 1943). 
The provision for assessing attorney's fees against a defendant employer 
under the FLSA is for the purpose of fostering justifiable litigation without expense 
to the employee-plaintiff, Hutchinson v William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F Supp 292 (DC 
Mass 1943). An award of attorney's fees pursuant to 29 USC §216(b) is not made to 
the plaintiff's attorney, but is part of the judgment recovered by the employee, to 
whom the attorney must look for payment, Ferraro v Arthur M. Rosenberg Co., 156 
F2d 212, (CA2 Conn 1946), Re L. E. Elliot Brokerage Co., 48 F Supp 144 (DC Kan 
1942). Statutorily authorized attorney's fees, such as those under 29 USC §216(b), 
are to be treated like contractually stipulated fees, Johnson v University of 
Bridgeport, 629 F2d 828 (CA2 Conn 1980). 
The factors to be considered in setting attorney's fees awards in federal civil 
rights litigation under 42 USC §1988 were stated in Hensley v Eckerbart, 461 US 
424, 103 S Ct 1933, 76 L Ed 2d 40 (1983). These factors were applied to FLSA cases 
in Kreager v Solomon and Flanagan, P.A., 775 F2d 1541, 27 BNA WH Cas 689, 103 
CCH LC H34717, 3 FR Serv 3d 225 (CA11 Fla 1985). 
The 12 factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the 
legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of employment of the 
attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by 
the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the 
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and the ability of the 
attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards 
in similar cases. 488 F2d, at 717-719. 
461 US at 428, note 3. 
Where pro se attorneys have rendered legal services compensable under 42 
USC §1988, the cases deciding the issue have uniformly held that they may be 
awarded attorney's fees, Duncan v Poythress, 111 F2d 1508 (CAll Ga 1985), Ellis 
v Cassidy, 625 F2d 227 (CA9 Hawaii 1980), Rybicki v State Bd. of Elections, 584 F 
Supp 849 (ND 111 1984), Lanasa v City of New Orleans, 619 F Supp 39 (ED La 1985). 
See also Award of Attorneys' Fees to Pro Se Litigant Under 42 USCS §1988, 82 ALR 
Fed 800. Where the pro se litigant is not an attorney, attorney's fees claimed under 
42 USC §1988 have been denied, Turman v Tuttle, 711 F2d 148 (CA10 Colo 1983). 
It should be noted that 42 USC §1988 awards "...a reasonable attorney's fee 
as part of the costs." This language does not appear to be as forceful as 29 USC 
§216(b)fs award of attorney's fees as part of the judgment, Ferraro, supra. 
The general reasons given for allowing attorney's fees to pro se civil rights 
litigants who are attorneys are enlightening: There is no express prohibition in the 
statute, Duncan, supra.; it promotes the statutory purpose, Lanasa, supra, and 
Duncan, supra; such awards promote and encourage representation by competent 
counsel, Lanasa, supra, and Rybicki, supra; there is no difficulty in establishing the 
value of the legal services rendered where there is an established billing and fee 
practice, Rybicki, supra, and Ellis, supra; actual pecuniary loss is incurred from the 
effect that the litigation has on the pro se attorney's private practice in time and 
overhead, Rybicki, supra, Ellis, supra, and Duncan, supra. 
Those same considerations apply when a pro se attorney is forced to sue for 
his wages earned in a different capacity. 29 USC §216(b) does not prohibit the 
award of attorney's fees to pro se attorney litigants. An award would further the 
FLSA!s statutory purpose and would encourage employees to obtain competent legal 
representation of their claims. This litigation has been conducted to preserve as 
much judicial economy as possible. Smith has thus far substantially prevailed. 
Smith has submitted to the district court affidavits of attorney's fees supported by 
contemporaneous time records. These affidavits are the same as required of, and 
which must be submitted by, any attorney attempting to recover attorney's fee 
under contract or statute, pursuant to Rule 4-505, R. Jud. Admin. 
Most importantly, to deny Smith an award of attorney's fees would violate 
the FLSAfs remedial purpose to not penalize the plaintiff-employee. To deny him 
the value of the reasonable time expended as an attorney in bringing this matter to 
a successful conclusion would be forcing him to expend, for free, billable time equal 
to about half of the overtime sued for. In terms of actual professional cost, it will 
render the judgment already awarded, plus the liquidated damages, if awarded, a 
virtual nullity. Further, it will encourage defendants to engage in as many 
prolonged legal delays as possible, without fear of any consequences for liability for 
attorney's fees under Rule 11 or the other provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Clearly, a pro se attorney who can not obtain reasonable attorney's fees 
under the non-discretionary provisions of the FLSA or the UPW will not be entitled 
to the discretionary compensations provided for under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Attorney's Fees Under State Law 
Smith met the statutory requirements of the mandatory attorney's fees 
provision of Utah Code Ann, §34-27-1, which the district court acknowledged. 
Attorney's fees were denied anyway, "considering the equities in this case." With 
Cabrera, supra, negating the equity argument as to attorney's fees, the remaining 
issue to be decided by this Court is whether, under state law, a pro se attorney is 
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to a non-discretionary 
statute. Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 relevantly provides ?fit shall be the duty of the 
court...to allow to the plaintiff a reasonable attorneys' fee..., to be taxed as costs 
of suit." 
The statute does not require that the fee actually be incurred. A "reasonable 
attorney's fee" must also be paid to the prevailing party, without other limitation, 
under the following sections of the Utah Code Ann.: §13-11-17.5, dealing with 
violations of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, with fees awardable to "the 
enforcing authority"; §13-21-9 for violations of the Credit Services Organizations 
Act, with fees awardable to the Division of Consumer Protection; §13-23-7 for 
violations of the Health Spas Act, with fees awardable to the Division of Consumer 
Protection; §31 A-15-108 in actions against unauthorized insurers; §38-9-1 where 
there is slander of title; §54-6-12 dealing with bad faith actions under the Motor 
Carrier Act; §57-19-21 for agreements void under the Timeshare and Camp Resort 
Projects Act; §70C-7-106(4), dealing with unconscionable credit agreements; §70C-
7-204, dealing with violations of the Utah Consumer Credit Code; §76-6a-6, in an 
action to recover funds spent in a pyramid scheme; §76-10-1604, under the 
Racketeering Enterprises Act; §78-11-15 and -16 where there is civil liability for 
shoplifting; §78-23-13, which may be awarded in addition to the injunctive relief 
obtained under the Utah Exemptions Act; and §78-27-56 for bad faith defenses. 
It appears that the Utah Legislature has specifically allowed reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party without further limitation in circumstances 
where the allowance is intended as part of a full and complete compensation, and 
where any possible windfall to the attorney will serve as both a punishment to the 
transgressor and will encourage the bar to more actively secure the rights 
protected. Further, it appears that some of the statutes anticipate actions by 
enforcing authorities on their own behalf, using their own staff attorneys. These 
actions by pro se attorney agencies are specifically allowed reasonable attorney's 
fees in some instances, with the other statutes silent on the matter. 
This analysis appears reasonable when examining the other statutes of the 
Utah Code Ann. which, when awarding attorney's fees, at a minimum require that 
they actually be incurred: §63-30c-2 for the reimbursement of public officers; §63-
63-18 to obtain compensation under the Victim Restitution Act; §75-3-718 as 
reasonable compensation in probate proceedings; §78-11-10 and §78-16-3 in actions 
against officers; §78-27a-3, under the Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act; 
and §78-37-9 where claimed as a part of the plaintiff's foreclosure. These statues 
are directed more at reimbursement and actual compensation for costs incurred or 
services rendered by the affected party. 
It appears that Utah is fortunate to have a legislature capable of drafting 
statutes that actually mean what they say, unlike the states of Idaho and Louisiana, 
where the appellate courts concluded that statutes with unlimited reasonable 
attorney's provisions were meant to exclude the reasonable attorney's fees of a pro 
se attorney, Swanson v Setzke, Chtd., 11A P2d 909 (Idaho App 1989), Golden v 
Riverside Apartments, Inc.,, 488 So2d 478 (La App 3d Cir 1986). The logic in 
Swanson, supra, is that there is no attorney-client relationship. This argument found 
support in Arizona in Connor v Cal-Az Properties, Inc., 668 P2d 896 (Ariz App 1983). 
Golden's, supra, logic is that the expenses must be out-of-pocket. See also Right 
of Party Who is Attorney and Appears for Himself to Award of Attorneyfs Fees 
Against Opposing Party as Element of Costs, 78 ALR3d 1119. 
The majority of the states recently deciding the issue have allowed an award 
of attorney's fees to pro se attorneys, although this conclusion was disputed by the 
court in Swanson, supra, at 910, Burrell v Hanger, 650 P2d 386 (Alaska 1982), 
Renfrew v Loysen, 175 Cal App 3d 1105, 222 Cal Rptr 413 (Cal 2d Dist 1985), Wells 
v Whinery, 192 NW2d 81 (Mich App 1971), Winer v Jonal Corp., 545 P2d 1094 (Mont 
1976), Friedman v Backman, 453 So2d 938, 9 FLW 1767 (Fl App D4 1984), People v 
Lawless, 100 111 App 3d 74, 55 111 Dec 399, 426 NE2d 545 (111 App 1981), McMahon 
v Schwartz, 109 Misc 2d 80, 438 NYS2d 215 (NY 1981), Hamilton v Telex Corp., 625 
P2d 106 (Okla 1981). The reasons given for allowing attorney's fees to pro se 
attorneys are similar to the ones given by the federal courts cited above. 
One of the best analysis was made in Weaver v Laub, 574 P2d 609 (Okla 1977) 
which involved attorneys seeking fees for themselves in a partition action. To avoid 
the problems of bad faith actions and unnecessary work, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court made the additional requirement of pro se attorneys that they attest under 
oath to the good-faith of the reasonable and necessary services rendered, and submit 
an itemized billing, giving the time spent on, and an explanation of, each item, 574 
P2d 609, at 613. 
These requirements are met, for the most part, in Utah's Rule 4-505, R. Jud. 
Admin, for attorney's fees affidavits. The first two parts of the Rule address 
different concerns. The first part requires the attorney to affirm, under oath, the 
number of hours, the work performed, and the reasonableness of the fees sought for 
comparable legal services. This allows a pro se attorney, or, say, a salaried attorney 
with an enforcing authority, to add up his hours at his hourly rate, if available, or 
the prevailing rate, if not, examine the result achieved, and then make a claim for 
reasonable services based, not upon actual cost, but upon what comparable services 
by a private hourly attorney would cost to achieve the result obtained. If the actual 
cost to the client is not the same as the amount claimed in the first part of the 
Rule, the second part requires the attorney to disclose the terms and conditions of 
the arrangement. 
This bifurcation of the Rule between an affirmation of the "reasonableness 
of the fees for comparable legal services" under 4-505(1) R. Jud. Admin, and the 
required disclosure of fee arrangements with clients which are "other than at an 
hourly rate" under 4-505(2) R. Jud. Admin, demonstrates an understanding that the 
issue to be decided in awarding fees against a party is not how reasonable the fees 
are to the client, but how reasonable is the award against the paying party? The 
two charges are usually, but not necessarily, identical. 
Those who contemplate a violation of a statute that, without exception, 
awards reasonable attorneyfs fees should know that those fees, when awarded, will 
be based upon the prevailing rate for professional services, regardless of whether 
the attorney for the prevailing party is salaried, pro se, pro bono, with a governmen-
tal agency, or with a nonprofit organization. The Supreme Court has recognized this 
distinction, holding that reasonable fees under 42 USC §1988 are to be calculated 
according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community regardless of 
whether the prevailing party is represented by private or nonprofit counsel, Blum 
v Stenson, 465 US 886, 79 L Ed 2d 891, 104 S Ct 1541, (1984). 
Conclusion 
Smith has established a record of uncontroverted evidence that establishes 
a claim for wages under the FLSA. Pursuant to 29 USC §216(b), Smith is entitled 
to an award of liquidated damages against defendants in the sum of $3,544.80, and 
an order that the order of judgment be amended to reflect the additional amount of 
award. Having established his right to an award of attorneyfs fees under 29 USC 
§216(b) and pursuant Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1, Smith is also entitled to an order 
remanding this case to the district court for a determination of Smithfs reasonable 
attorney's fee both at the trial and appellate level, to include an order that the 
judgment be amended to included the fees awarded and, further, that it contain the 
language for augmentation contained in Rule 4-505(3), R. Jud. Admin. 
Dated this 31st Day of May, 1990. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
Stephen R. Smith, Jr. : 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : Certificate of Service 
vs. : 
Dorothy K. Batchelor, Larry : 
Peterman, and Janae Kingston : Civil NO: 900153 
dba Movie Buffs, : 
Defendants and Appellees. : 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
I, Stephen R. Smith, Jr., certify that on May 31st, 1990 I served four copies 
of the attached Brief of Appellant upon John T. Caine, the counsel for the appellees 
in this matter, by mailing them to him by first class mail with sufficient postage 
prepaid to the following address: 
John T. Caine 
Richards Caine & Allen 
Addendum 
Order of Judgment Appealed From (Index pp. 118-121) 
Statement of Material Facts From Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment and Order Compelling Discovery from Defendants 
(Index pp. 85-89) 
Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment (Index pp. 101-103) 
29 USCS §§206, 207, 216, and 260, with amendments 
Utah Code Unann. §§34-26-4 to 34-28-8 (1989) 
Utah Code Unann. Rule 4-505, R. Jud. Admin. (1989) 
STEPHEN R. SMITH, JR. #3015 
Pro Se 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-5635 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
Stephen R. Smith, Jr. : ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
Dorothy K. Batchelor, Larry Peterman, : Civil NO: CV 46197 
and Janae Kingston dba Movie Buffs, : 
Defendants. : JUDGE: CORNABY 
—oooOooo— 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for ruling pursuant 
to a Notice to Submit for Decision on December 13, 1989, the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby presiding. Plaintiff appeared pro se and all Defendants were represented by 
counsel, Pete N. Vlahos. Plaintiff's Motion was filed November 15, 1989. Defendants 
responded to Plaintiff's Motion with a general objection filed on December 7, 1989, alleging 
generally that there are issues of fact to be resolved by trial, but without stating any legal 
reason why Plaintiff's Motion should not be granted. 
The factual basis for Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment relies upon Plaintiff's 
Affidavit and Requests for Admissions deemed admitted pursuant to URCP Rule 36(a), 
which provides in relevant part: 
FiU&D 
The request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom 
the request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed 
admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of 
the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. 
Plaintiff mailed Requests for Admissions directed to each Defendant on October 6, 
1989. On October 12, 1989, Plaintiff mailed a special notice to counsel for Defendants to 
advise his clients that, regarding the Requests for Admissions, and "pursuant to rule 36, the 
matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after 
service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow." 
Commencing the time period to answer Plaintiff's Requests from the date of said notice, 
and allowing three days for mail, the time to answer Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions 
expired on November 15, 1989. Defendants filed certificates of Service of Discovery dated 
November 30, 1989, or 15 days late. Under Rule 36, the Requests for Admissions directed 
to each Defendant are deemed admitted. 
Each Defendant has admitted and Plaintiff's Affidavit is evidence that Plaintiff is 
owed $3,544.80 in back wages. Therefore, Plaintiff is awarded judgment for $3,544.80 in 
back wages. 
Plaintiff made written demand for immediate payment for back wages totaling 
$2,657.95 immediately after his employment ceased. Defendants have not paid, and 
Plaintiff has established that he was entitled to more than the dollar amount of the back 
wages demanded. Plaintiff was paid $2,000.00 per month when last employed. Pursuant 
Utah Code §34-28-5(2), Plaintiff is entitled to have his wages continue for a period of up 
to 60 days from the date of demand until paid. Plaintiff is awarded an additional penalty 
against Defendants of $4,000.00. 
Plaintiff also asks for attorneys fees. Plaintiff is an attorney. While Utah Code 
§34-27-1 calls for attorneys fees, the court believes that the award of the $4,000.00 
penalty is sufficient considering the equities in this case. Plaintiff's motion for attorney's 
fees is denied. 
Plaintiff has also requested recovery under provisions of federal law. Plaintiff 
cannot recover under both federal and state laws for the same loss. Plaintiff's motion for 
back wages pursuant to USCS §206(a) is denied. Plaintiff's motion for overtime wages 
pursuant to USCS §207(a)(l) is denied. Plaintiff's motion for liquidated damages and 
attorney's fees pursuant to USCS §216(b) is denied. 
Based upon the record on file herein, the Court now 
Orders, Adjudges, and Decrees: 
Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against Defendants Dorothy K. Batchelor, Larry 
Peterman, and Janae Kingston dba Movie Buffs, jointly and severally, in the sum of 
$7,544.80, plus Costs in the amount of $ . . Said Judgment and Costs shall bear 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
Dated t h i s ^ th Day of January, 1990. 
Approved as to Form: 
Pete N. Vlahos 
Attorney for Defendants 
Judgement Debtors: 
Name: Dorothy K. Batchelor Larry Peterman Janae Kingston 
Street: 
City, State: Roy, Utah West Point, Utah West Point, Utah 
Soc. Sec. #: 
Certificate of Service 
THIS WILL CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forgoing Order of 
Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to Pete N. Vlahos, attorney for Defendants, Vlahos, 
Sharp, Wight, & Walpole, Legal Forum Building, 2447 Keisel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
this 4th day of January, 1990. 
D a i s 12 32 frt '&3 
STEPHEN R. SMITH, JR. #3015 
Pro Se 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-5635 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo-
Stephen R. Smith, Jr. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Dorothy K. Batchelor, Larry Peterman, 
and Janae Kingston dba Movie Buffs, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING 
DISCOVERY FROM DEFENDANTS 
Civil NO: CV 46197 
JUDGE: CORNABY 
—oooOooo— 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Stephen R. Smith, Jr., who respectfully submits the 
following Points and Authorities in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion for Order Compelling Discovery from Defendants. 
Statement of Material Facts 
Pursuant to RJA Rule 4-501(4), Plaintiff submits the following statement of 
material facts as to which Plaintiff contends no genuine issue exists which are sufficient 
to support a Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. On October 6, 1989 Plaintiff mailed two packages of discovery requests to 
counsel for Defendants and mailed a Certificate of Service to the Clerk of Court for 
i KU ^.flcn 
each of the three discovery requests. A copy of Plaintiff's first set of Requests for 
Admissions, Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents upon each of the 
Defendants is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit "Eff for 
Defendant Janae Kingston, Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" for Defendant Larry Peterman, and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "G" for Defendant Dorothy K. Batchelor. Plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "B", 
"Cff, and "D", attached to each of the discovery requests are also attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference. A copy of a corrections letter mailed to counsel for 
Defendants on October 6, 1989 and a follow-up letter mailed to counsel for Defendants 
on October 12, 1989 are also attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Plaintiff's 
Exhibits ffH" and "I". Plaintiff's Detail Time Usage Report of attorney's time and costs 
is incorporated herein by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit ,fJff. Said exhibits shall 
hereinafter be referred to as ffP-A" through "P-J" for brevity. 
2. Plaintiff has received no reply to any of the discovery requests or 
correspondence sent to counsel for Defendants and no response has been filed with the 
Court. 
3. Allowing three days for mail, the 30 days allowed for reply to discovery elapsed 
on November 8, 1989. Plaintiff's Certificates of Service for each of the discovery 
requests was posted as received by the Clerk of Court on October 10, 1989. 
4. Pursuant to URCP Rule 36(a), Defendants have conclusively admitted the 
following facts, which are additionally supported by the evidence of Plaintiff's affidavit 
submitted herewith. The Requests for Admissions shall hereinafter be referred to as 
ffRAB#" to each paragraph of the Requests for Admissions directed to Defendant Dorothy 
K. Batchelor; as "RAK#" to each paragraph of the Requests for Admissions directed to 
Defendant Janae Kingston; as "RAP#" to each paragraph of the Requests for Admissions 
directed to Defendant Larry Peterman; and as "AFS#,f to each paragraph of the Affidavit 
of Plaintiff Stephen R. Smith, Jr. 
5. Plaintiff worked for Movie Buffs from March 30, 1989 to August 3, 1989 
(RAB#16&30, RAK#11,33&34 RAP#18,41&42, AFS#2&12). 
6. P-A constitutes the agreement of employment between Plaintiff and Defendants 
without amendment or revision (RAB#l-4, RAK#l-4, RAP#l-7, AFS#2). 
7. Plaintiff was hired to provide computer services (P-A, AFS#2). 
8. Plaintiff was not hired as an employee-attorney (P-A, RAB#15, RAP#17). 
9. Most of Plaintiff's time of employment was not spent providing legal services 
to Movie Buffs (RAB#14, RAK#9, RAP#15, AFS#15). 
10. More than 90% of Plaintiff's time of employment was spent providing computer 
services to Movie Buffs (RAK#10, RAP#16, AFS#15). 
11. Only Defendant Larry Peterman ever requested Plaintiff to provide any legal 
services (RAB#12, RAK#7). 
12. All Defendants required Plaintiff to provide computer services (RAB#13, 
RAK#8, RAP#9). 
13. Plaintiff provided little in the way of legal services (AFS#15). 
14. Each day recorded on P-B is an accurate record of the hours worked by 
Plaintiff for Movie Buffs on that day (RAB#6&19, RAK#14, RAP#22, AFS#6). 
15. No other record of the hours worked by Plaintiff for Defendants exists 
(RAB#20, RAK#16, RAP#24, AFS#4). 
16. Plaintiff was not provided any other means to record his hours of employment 
(RAB#9, RAK#17, AFS#4). 
17. Defendants prevented Plaintiff from recording his hours of employment on 
regular time-sheets (RAB#8, RAP#13&14, AFS#4). 
18. Plaintiff regularly submitted incremental portions of P-B as his time records 
to Defendant Batchelor (RAB#5, RAK#15, RAP#23, AFS#5). 
19. Plaintiff worked at total of 790.2 hours (P-B, AFS#18). 
20. Plaintiff has been paid for 580 hours (P-B, RAB#29, RAK#32, RAP#40, 
AFS#18). 
21. Plaintiff was paid at the hourly rate of $11.65 per hour (RAB#28, RAK#31, 
RAP#39, AFS#3&14). 
22. Plaintiff has accrued 188.15 overtime hours (P-B, AFS#18). 
23. Plaintiff has not been paid his regular wages for the period from July 24, 1989 
through August 3, 1989 (RAB#17&18, RAK#12&13, RAP#20&21, AFS#14). 
24. Defendants owe Plaintiff $3,544.80 in back wages (RAB#24, RAK#27, RAP#35, 
AFS#20). 
25. Plaintiff made written demand for wages due and owing (P-C, P-D, 
RAB#25&26, RAK#28&29, RAP#36&37, AFS#11-14). 
26. Defendants are Residents of Davis County, state of Utah (fll Complaint, 511 
Answer admitting). 
27. Defendants are doing business in Utah and Wyoming as Movie Buffs, a dba 
registered in the state of Utah under the name of Defendant Janae Kingston, with its 
principle place of business in Layton, Davis County, state of Utah (fl2 Complaint, fll 
Answer admitting). 
28. Said business has stores in Utah and Wyoming, has more than 10 employees, and 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (fl3 Complaint, fll 
Answer admitting). 
29. Defendant Larry Peterman was the general manager of Movie Buffs and hired 
Plaintiff (fl4 Complaint, Hi Answer admitting). 
30. Defendant Dorothy K. Batchelor was the personnel manager and maintained 
all employee records (fl5 Complaint, fl2 Answer admitting). 
31. All defendants are employers and agents for each other. Dorothy K. Batchelor 
is the mother of Janae Kingston, who in turn is the common-law wife of Larry Peterman 
(516 Complaint, 513 Answer admitting). 
Argument 
Requests for Admissions Deemed Admitted 
URCP Rule 36(a) provides in relevant part "the matters shall be deemed admitted 
unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within 
such shorter or longer time as the court may allow." Such admissions are conclusively 
CEC 1 3 o 3 f H T u S 
PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorney for Defendants 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN R. SMITH, JR. ) OBJECTION TO MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) CIVIL NO: CV 46197 
DORTHY K. BATCHELOR, LARRY ) 
PETERMAN, and JANAE KINGSTON ) 
dba MOVIE BUFFS, ) 
) JUDGE: DOUGLAS L. CORNABY 
Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW the Defendants above-named, by their attor-
ney, Pete N. Vlahos, and herein object to the granting of a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that the Interroga-
tories were not answered and/or for the Request for Produc-
tion of Documents. 
That the Plaintiff submitted to the Defendants some 63 
Interrogatories, plus Request for Production of Documents 
and that the Defendants had a very difficult time in at-
tempting to obtain the information since they are volumi-
nous. 
Smith vs. Ba lelor, et al. 
Civil No: 461^7 
That the Answers to the Request for Production of 
Documents and the Interrogatories have been answered and 
were answered as of November 30th, and a Certificate filed 
with the Davis County Clerk's Office on December 1, 1989. 
That the Defendants deny the allegations that Ad-
missions should be deemed admitted in that there is a 
material issue of fact of law relative to this matter and 
that the Defendants are entitled to their day in Court and 
Plaintiff is attempting to obtain judgment without having 
the matter heard or tried in Court, and that the Defendants 
have legitimate defenses which should be heard by the Court. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment be denied and that Defendants be allowed to 
pursue their discovery, and for such other and further order 
as the Court may deem appropriate. 
DATED this day of December, 1989. 
Smith vs. Be lelor, et al. 
Civil No: 46i^7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
> ^ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ' day of November, 
1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by 
placing same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed 
to the following: 
Stephen R. Smith, Jr. 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
THE CODE OF THE LAWS 
OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
TITLE 29 — LABOR 
CHAPTER 8. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 
[§§ 206-219 of 29 USCS, Chapter 8, are contained in this volume] 
Section 
201. Short title 
202. Finding and declaration of policy 
203. Definitions 
204. Administrator 
205. Special industry committees for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands 
206. Minimum wages 
207. Maximum hours 
208. Wage orders in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands 
209. Attendance of witnesses 
210. Court review 
211. Investigation, inspections, record, and homework regulations 
212. Child labor provisions 
213. Exemptions 
214. Learners, apprentices, students, and handicapped workers 
215. Prohibited acts—Prima facie evidence 
216. Penalties—Civil and criminal liability—Enforcement procedure—Sav-
ings provisions 
216a. [Repealed] 
216b. Liability for overtime work performed prior to July 20, 1949 
217. Injunction proceedings 
218. Relation to other laws 
219. Separability of provisions 
§ 206. Minimum wages 
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
1 
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commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: 
(1) not less than $2 an hour during the period ending December 31, 
1974, not less than $2.10 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 
1975, and not less than $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1975, except 
as otherwise provided in this section; 
(2) if such employee is a home worker in Puerto Rico or the Virgin 
Islands, not less than the minimum piece rate prescribed by regulation 
or order; or, if no such minimum piece rate is in effect, any piece rate 
adopted by such employer which shall yield, to the proportion or class 
of employees prescribed by regulation or order, not less than the 
applicable minimum hourly wage rate. Such minimum piece rates or 
employer piece rates shall be commensurate with, and shall be paid in 
lieu of, the minimum hourly wage rate applicable under the provisions 
of this section. The Administrator, or his authorized representative, shall 
have power to make such regulations or orders as are necessary or 
appropriate to carry out any of the provisions of this paragraph, 
including the power without limiting the generality of the foregoing, to 
define any operation or occupation which is performed by such home 
work employees in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands; to establish 
minimum piece rates for any operation or occupation so defined; to 
prescribe the method and procedure for ascertaining and promulgating 
minimum piece rates; to prescribe standards for employer piece rates, 
including the proportion or class of employees who shall receive not less 
than the minimum hourly wage rates; to define the term "home 
worker"; and to prescribe the conditions under which employers, agents, 
contractors, and subcontractors shall cause goods to be produced by 
home workers; 
(3) if such employee is employed in American Samoa, in lieu of the rate 
or rates provided by this subsection or subsection (b), not less than the 
applicable rate established by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with 
recommendations of a special industry committee or committees which 
he shall appoint in the same manner and pursuant to the same provi-
sions as are applicable to the special industry committees provided for 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands by this Act [29 USCS §§ 201-216, 
217-219, 557] as amended from time to time. Each such committee shall 
have the same powers and duties and shall apply the same standards 
with respect to the application of the provisions of this Act [29 USCS 
§§201-216, 217-219, 557] to employees employed in American Samoa 
as pertain to special industry committees established under section 5 [29 
USCS § 205] with respect to employees employed in Puerto Rico or the 
Virgin Islands. The minimum wage rate thus established shall not 
exceed the rate prescribed in paragraph (1) of this subsection; 
(4) if such employee is employed as a seaman on an American vessel, 
not less than the rate which will provide to the employee, for the period 
2 
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covered by the wage payment, wages equal to compensation at th 
hourly rate prescribed by paragraph (1) of this subsection for all hour 
during such period when he was actually on duty (including period 
aboard ship when the employee was on watch or was, at the direction c 
a superior officer, performing work or standing by, but not including ofl 
duty periods which are provided pursuant to the employment agree 
ment); or 
(5) if such employee is employed in agriculture, not less than— 
(A) $1.60 an hour during the period ending December 31, 1974, 
(B) $1.80 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1975, 
(C) $2 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1976, 
(D) $2.20 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1977, and 
(E) $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1977. 
(b) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees (other than ai 
employee to whom subsection (a)(5) applies) who in any workweek i, 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or i, 
employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production o 
goods for commerce, and who in such workweek is brought within th< 
purview of this section by the amendments made to this Act by the FaL 
Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 [29 USCS §§203, 206, 207, 213 
214, 216, 218, 255], title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, or th< 
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, wages at the following rates: 
(1) not less than $1.90 an hour during the period ending December 31 
1974, 
(2) not less than $2 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1975, 
(3) not less than $2.20 an hour during the year beginning January 1 
1976, and 
(4) not less than $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1976. 
(c)(1) The rate or rates provided by subsections (a) and (b) of this section 
shall be superseded in the case of any employee in Puerto Rico or the 
Virgin Islands only for so long as and insofar as such employee is 
covered by a wage order heretofore or hereafter issued by the Secretary 
pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee 
appointed pursuant to section 5 [29 USCS § 205]. 
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), in the case of any 
employee who is covered by such a wage order on the date of enactment 
of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 and to whom the rate 
or rates prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) would otherwise apply, the 
wage rate applicable to such employee shall be increased as follows: 
(A) Effective on the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1974 [May 1, 1974], the wage order rate applicable to 
such employee on the day before such date shall— 
(i) if such rate is under $1.40 an hour, be increased by $0.12 an 
hour, and 
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(ii) if such rate is $1.40 or more an hour, be increased by $0.15 an 
hour. 
(B) Effective on the first day of the second and each subsequent year 
after such date, the highest wage order rate applicable to such 
employees on the date before such first day shall— 
(i) if such rate is under $1.40 an hour, be increased by $0.12 an 
hour, and 
(ii) if such rate is $1.40 or more an hour, be increased by $0.15 an 
hour. 
In the case of any employee employed in agriculture who is covered by 
a wage order issued by the Secretary pursuant to the recommendations 
of a special industry committee appointed pursuant to section 5 [29 
USCS § 205], to whom the rate or rates prescribed by subsection (a)(5) 
would otherwise apply, and whose hourly wage is increased above the 
wage rate prescribed by such wage order by a subsidy (or income 
supplement) paid, in whole or in part, by the government of Puerto 
Rico, the increases prescribed by this paragraph shall be applied to the 
sum of the wage rate in effect under such wage order and the amount by 
which the employee's hourly wage rate is increased by the subsidy (or 
income supplement) above the wage rate in effect under such wage 
order. 
(3) In the case of any employee employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin 
Islands to whom this section is made applicable by the amendments 
made to this Act [29 USCS §§201-216, 217-219, 557] by the Fair 
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, the Secretary shall, as soon as 
practicable after the date of enactment of the Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1974 [Apr. 8, 1974], appoint a special industry commit-
tee in accordance with section 5 [29 USCS § 205] to recommend the 
highest minimum wage rate or rates, which shall be not less than 60 per 
centum of the otherwise applicable minimum wage rate in effect under 
subsection (b) or $1.00 an hour, whichever is greater, to be applicable to 
such employee in lieu of the rate or rates prescribed by subsection (b). 
The rate recommended by the special industry committee shall (A) be 
effective with respect to such employee upon the effective date of the 
wage order issued pursuant to such recommendation, but not before 
sixty days after the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974 [May 1, 1974], and (B) except in the case of employees of 
the government of Puerto Rico or any political subdivision thereof, be 
increased in accordance with paragraph (2)(B). 
(4)(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(A) or (3), the wage rate of any 
employee in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands which is subject to 
paragraph (2)(A) or (3) of this subsection, shall, on the effective date 
of the wage increase under paragraph (2)(A) or of the wage rate 
recommended under paragraph (3), as the case may be, be not less 
than 60 per centum of the otherwise applicable rate under subsection 
(a) or (b) or $1.00, whichever is higher. 
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(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(B), the wage rate of any employ 
in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands which is subject to paragra] 
(2)(B), shall, on and after the effective date of the first wage increa 
under paragraph (2)(B), be not less than 60 per centum of tl 
otherwise applicable rate under subsection (a) or (b) or $1.00, whic 
ever is higher. 
(5) If the wage rate of an employee is to be increased under tl 
subsection to a wage rate which equals or is greater than the wage ra 
under subsection (a) or (b) which, but for paragraph (1) of tfc 
subsection, would be applicable to such employee, this subsection shi 
be inapplicable to such employee and the applicable rate under su< 
subsection shall apply to such employee. 
(6) Each minimum wage rate prescribed by or under paragraph (2) < 
(3) shall be in effect unless such minimum wage rate has been supe 
seded by a wage order (issued by the Secretary pursuant to tl 
recommendation of a special industry committee convened under sectk 
8) fixing a higher minimum wage rate. 
(d)(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of th 
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which sue 
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex I 
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than tl 
rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in sue 
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requir 
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed und 
similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursi 
ant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system whic 
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) 
differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That i 
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of th 
subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of th 
subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee. 
(2) No labor organization, or its agents, representing employees of i 
employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section sha 
cause or attempt to cause such an employer to discriminate against a 
employee in violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection. 
i^(3) For purposes of administration and enforcement, any amounts owir 
to any employee which have been withheld in violation of this subse 
tion shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtin 
compensation under this Act [29 USCS §§ 201-216, 217-219, 557]. 
(4) As used in this subsection, the term "labor organization" means ar 
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representatic 
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists ft 
the purpose, in whole or in part, or dealing with employers concernir 
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, < 
conditions of work. 
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(e)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13 of this Act [29 USCS 
§ 213] (except subsections (a)(1) and (f) thereof), every employer provid-
ing any contract services (other than linen supply services) under a 
contract with the United States or any subcontract thereunder shall pay 
to each of his employees whose rate of pay is not governed by the 
Service Contract Act of 1965 (41 USC 351-357) [41 USCS §§ 351-357] 
or to whom subsection (a)(1) of this section is not applicable, wages at 
rates not less than the rates provided for in subsection (b) of this 
section. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13 of this Act [29 USCS 
§ 213] (except subsections (a)(1) and (f) thereof) and the provisions of 
the Service Contract Act of 1965 [41 USCS §§ 351-357], every employer 
in an establishment providing linen supply services to the United States 
under a contract with the United States or any subcontract thereunder 
shall pay to each of his employees in such establishment wages at rates 
not less than those prescribed in subsection (b), except that if more than 
50 per centum of the gross annual dollar volume of sales made or 
business done by such establishment is derived from providing such 
linen supply services under any such contracts or subcontracts, such 
employer shall pay to each of his employees in such establishment wages 
at rates not less than those prescribed in subsection (a)(1) of this section. 
(f) Any employee— 
(1) who in any workweek is employed in domestic service in a house-
hold shall be paid wages at a rate not less than the wage rate in effect 
under section 6(b) [subsec. (b) this section] unless such employee's 
compensation for such service would not because of section 209(g) of the 
Social Security Act [42 USCS § 409(g)] constitute wages for the pur-
poses of title II of such Act [42 USCS §§ 401, 402-410, 411-418, 420-
423, 424a-426, 427-431], or 
(2) who in any workweek— 
(A) is employed in domestic service in one or more households, and 
(B) is so employed for more than 8 hours in the aggregate, shall be 
paid wages for such employment in such workweek at a rate not less 
than the wage rate in effect under section 6(b) [subsec. (b) this 
section]. 
(June 25, 1938, c. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062; June 26, 1940, c. 432, § 3(e), (f), 
54 Stat. 616; Oct. 26, 1949, c. 736, § 6, 63 Stat. 912; Aug. 12, 1955, c. 867, 
§3, 69 Stat. 711; Aug. 8, 1956, c. 1035, §2, 70 Stat. 1118; May 5, 1961, 
P.L. 87-30, § 5, 75 Stat. 67; June 10, 1963, P. L. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56; 
Sept. 23, 1966, P. L. 89-601, Title III, §§ 301-305, 80 Stat. 838-841; Apr. 
8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, §§ 2-4, 5(b), 7(b)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 56, 62.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972", referred to in subsec 
(b) of this section, is Act June 23, 1972, P. L. 92-318, Title IX, §§ 901-
907, 86 Stat. 373-375, and appears as 20 USCS §§ 1681, 1682, 1683, 
6 
THE CODE OF THE LAWS 
OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
TITLE 29 — LABOR 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
[Chapters 8, §§ 206-219, 9 and 10 are contained in this volume] 
Chapter Beginning Section 
13. Exemplary Rehabilitation Certificates [Repealed] 601 
17. Comprehensive Employment and Training Act [Repealed] 801 
19. Job Training Partnership 1501 
20. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection 1801 
21. Helen Keller National Center for Deaf-Blind Youths and Adults 1901 
22. Employee Polygraph Protection 2001 
23. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 2101 
24. Technology Related Assistance for Individuals With Disabilities 2201 
§ 206. Minimum wages 
(a) [Introductory material unchanged] 
(1) not less than $2.65 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1978, not less than 
$2.90 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1979, not less than $3.10 an hour 
during the year beginning January 1, 1980, and not less than $3.35 an hour after 
December 31, 1980, except as otherwise provided in this section; 
(2H4) [Unchanged] 
(5) if such employee is employed in agriculture, not less than the minimum wage rate in 
effect under paragraph (1) after December 31, 1977. 
(b) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees (other than an employee to whom 
subsection (a)(5) applies) who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production 
of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce, and who in such workweek is brought within the purview 
of this section by the amendments made to this Act by the Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1966 [29 USCS §§ 203, 206, 207, 213, 214, 216, 218, 255], title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, or the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, wages at the 
following rate: Effective after December 31, 1977, not less than the minimum wage rate in 
effect under subsection (a)(1). 
(c)(1) The rate or rates provided by subsection (a)(1) of this section shall be superseded in the 
case of any employee in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands only for so long as and insofar 
as such employee is covered by a wage order (A) heretofore or hereafter issued by the 
Secretary pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee appointed 
pursuant to section 5 [29 USCS § 205], and (B) which prescribes a wage order rate which 
is less than the wage rate in effect under subsection (a)(1). 
(2)(A) Each wage order rate under a wage order described in paragraph (1) which on 
December 31, 1977, is at least $2 an hour shall, except as provided in paragraph (3), be 
increased— 
(i) effective January 1, 1978, by $0.25 an hour or by such greater amount as may be 
recommended by a special industry committee under section 8, and 
(Vi) effective J^nuarv 1. 1979. and Jarmarv 1 of each succeedine vear. Hv SO.30 an 
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hour or by such greater amount as may be so recommended by such a special 
industry committee. 
(B) Each wage order rate under a wage order described in paragraph (1) which on 
December 31, 1977, is less than $2 an hour shall, except as provided in paragraph (3), 
be increased— 
(i) effective January 1, 1978, by $0.20 an hour or by such greater amount as may be 
recommended by a special industry committee under section 8, and 
(ii) effective January 1, 1979, and January 1 of each succeeding year— 
(I) until such wage order rate is not less than $2.30 an hour, by $0.25 an hour or 
by such greater amount as may be so recommended by a special industry 
committee, and 
(II) if such wage order rate is not less than $2.30 an hour, by $0.30 an hour or 
by such greater amount as may be so recommended by a special industry 
committee. 
(C) In the case of any employee in agriculture who is covered by a wage order issued 
by the Secretary pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee 
appointed pursuant to section 5 [29 USCS § 205], to whom the rate or rates prescribed 
by subsection (a)(5) of this section would otherwise apply, and whose hourly wage is 
increased above the wage rate prescribed by such wage order by a subsidy (or income 
supplement) paid, in whole or in part, by the government of Puerto Rico, the 
applicable increases prescribed by subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be applied to the sum 
of the wage rate in effect under such wage order and the amount by which the 
employee's hourly wage is increased by the sub.-id\
 voi income supplement) above the 
wage rate in effect under such wage order. 
(3) If the wage rate of an employee is to be increased under this subsection to a wage rate 
which equals or is greater than the wage rate under subsection (a)(1) which, but for 
paragraph (1) of this subsection, would be applicable to such employee, this subsection 
shall be inapplicable to such employee and the applicable rate under subsection (a)(1) shall 
apply to such employee. 
(4) Each minimum wage rate prescribed by or under paragraph (2) shall be in effect unless 
such minimum wage rate has been superseded by a wage order (issued by the Secretary 
pursuant to the recommendation of a special industry committee convened under section 
8) fixing a higher minimum wage rate. 
(dHO [Unchanged] 
(As amended Nov. 1, 1977, P. L. 95-151, § 2(a)-(c), (d)(1), (2), 91 Stat. 1245.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1977. Act Nov. 1, 1977, in subsec. (a), substituted para. (1) for one that read: "(1) not less 
than $2 an hour during the period ending December 31, 1974, not less than $2.10 an hour 
during the year beginning January 1, 1975, and not less than $2.30 an hour after December 
31, 1975, except as otherwise provided in this section;" and substituted para. (5) for one 
that read: "(5) if such employee is employed in agriculture, not less than— 
"(A) $1.60 an hour during the period ending December 31, 1974, 
"(B) $1.80 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1975, 
"(C) $2 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1976, 
"(D) $2.20 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1977, and 
"(E) $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1977."; 
In subsec. (b), such Act substituted "rate:" for "rates:", substituted "Effective after Dec. 
31, 1977, not less than the minimum wage rate in effect under subsec. (a)(1)." for paras. 
(l)-(4), which read: 
In the case of any employee employed in agriculture who is covered by a wage order issued 
by the Secretary pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee 
appointed pursuant to section 5, to whom the rate or rates prescribed by subsection (a)(5) 
would otherwise apply, and whose hourly wage is increased above the wage rate prescribed 
by such wage order by a subsidy (or income supplement) paid, in whole or in part, by the 
government of Puerto Rico, the increases prescribed by this paragraph shall be applied to 
the sum of the wage rate in effect under such wage order and the amount by which the 
employee's hourly wage rate is increased by the subsidy (or income supplement) above the 
wage rate in effect under such wage order. 
"(1) not less than $1.90 an hour during the period ending December 31, 1974, 
"(2) not less than $2 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1975, 
"(3) not less than $2.20 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1976, and 
"(4) not less than $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1976."; 
In subsec. (c), in para. (1), substituted "subsection (a)(1)" for "subsections (a) and (b)'\ 
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inserted "(A)", and inserted ,4, and (B) which prescribes a wage order rate which is less 
than the wage rate in effect under subsection (a)(1)", substituted para (2) for former paras 
(2)-(4) which read 
"(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), in the case of any employee who is 
covered by such a wage order on the date of enactment of the Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1974 and to whom the rate or rates prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) 
would otherwise apply, the wage rate applicable to such employee shall be increased as 
follows 
"(A) Effective on the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 
1974, the wage order rate applicable to such employee on the day before such date 
shall— 
"(l) if such rate is under $1 40 an hour, be increased by $0 12 an hour, and 
"(n) if such rate is $1 40 or more an hour, be increased by $0 15 an hour 
"(B) Effective on the first day of the second and each subsequent year after such 
date, the highest wage order rate applicable to such employees on the date before 
such first day shall— 
"(l) if such rate is under $1 40 an hour, be increased by $0 12 an hour, and 
"(n) if such rate is $1 40 or more an hour, be increased by $0 15 an hour 
"(3) In the case of any employee employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands to 
whom this section is made applicable by the amendments made to this Act by the Fair 
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, the Secretary shall, as soon as practicable after 
the date of enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, appoint a 
special industry committee in accordance with section 5 to recommend the highest 
minimum wage rate or rates, which shall be not less than 60 per centum of the 
otherwise applicable minimum wage rate in effect under subsection (b) or $1 00 an 
hour, whichever is greater, to be applicable to such employee in lieu of the rate or rates 
prescribed by subsection (b) The rate recommended by the special industry committee 
shall (A) be effective with respect to such employee upon the effective date of the wage 
order issued pursuant to such recommendation, but not before sixty days after the 
effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, and (B) except in the 
case of employees of the government of Puerto Rico or any political subdivision 
thereof, be increased in accordance with paragraph (2)(B) 
"(4)(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(A) or (3), the wage rate of any employee in 
Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands which is subject to paragraph (2)(A) or (3) of this 
subsection, shall, on the effective date of the wage increase under paragraph (2)(A) 
or of the wage rate recommended under paragraph (3), as the case may be, be not 
less than 60 per centum of the otherwise applicable rate under subsection (a) or (b) 
or $1 00, whichever is higher 
"(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(B), the wage rate of anv employee m Puerto 
Rico or the Virgin Islands which is subject to paragraph (2)(B), shall, on and after 
the effective date of the first wage increase under paragraph (2)(B), be not less than 
60 per centum of the otherwise applicable rate under subsection (a) or (b) or $1 00, 
whichever is higher " 
Such Act, in subsec (c), redesignated former paras (5) and (6) as paras (3) and (4), 
respectively, m para (3), as redesignated, substituted "subsection (a)(1)" the first time it 
appears for "subsection (a) or (b)", and the second time it appears, for "such subsection, 
and in para (4), as redesignated, deleted "or (3)" following "paragraph (2)" 
Transfer of functions: 
Section 1 of 1978 Reorg Plan No 1 of Feb 23, 1978, 43 Fed Reg 19807, provided 
"Transfer of Equal Pay Enforcement Functions 
"All functions related to enforcing or administering Section 6(d) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, as amended, (29 U S C 206(d) [this section]) are hereby transferred to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Such functions include, but shall not be 
limited to, the functions relating to equal pay administration and enforcement now vested 
in the Secretary of Labor, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor, and the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Sections 4(d)(1), 4(f), 
9, 11(a), (b), and (c), 16(b) and (c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 
(29 U S C 204(d)(1), 204(0, 209, 211(a), (b), and (c), 216(b) and (c) and 217 [29 USCS 
§§ 204(d)(1), (0, 209, 211(aMc), 216(b), (c), 217]) and Section 10(b)(1) of the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947, as amended, (29 U S C 259 [29 USCS § 259(b)(1)]) " 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Add 
29 CFR Parts 601-730, 778, 1620 
Delete 
29 CFR Parts 512, 601-657, 661-729, 800 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
§ 207. Maximum hours 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall 
employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed 
in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such em-
ployee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours 
above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular 
rate at which he is employed. 
(2) No employer shall employ any of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in 
the production of goods for commerce, and who in such workweek is 
brought within the purview of this subsection by the amendments made 
to this Act [29 USCS §§ 201-216, 217-219] by the Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1966 [29 USCS §§ 203, 206, 207, 213, 214, 216, 218]— 
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(A) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year 
from the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 
1966 [Feb. 1, 1967], 
(B) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second 
year from such date, or 
(C) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the 
second year from such date, 
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in 
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-
half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(b) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by 
employing any employee for a workweek in excess of that specified in such 
subsection without paying the compensation for overtime employment 
prescribed therein if such employee is so employed— 
(1) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of collective 
bargaining by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the 
National Labor Relations Board, which provides that no employee shall 
be employed more than one thousand and forty hours during any period 
of twenty-six consecutive weeks; or 
(2) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of collective 
bargaining by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the 
National Labor Relations Board, which provides that during a specified 
period of fifty-two consecutive weeks the employee shall be employed 
not more than two thousand two hundred and forty hours and shall be 
guaranteed not less than one thousand eight hundred and forty hours 
(or not less than forty-six weeks at the normal number of hours worked 
per week, but not less than thirty hours per week) and not more than 
two thousand and eighty hours of employment for which he shall 
receive compensation for all hours guaranteed or worked at rates not 
less than those applicable under the agreement to the work performed 
and for all hours in excess of the guaranty which are also in excess of 
the maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection 
(a) or two thousand and eighty in such period at rates not less than one 
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed; or 
(3) by an independently owned and controlled local enterprise (including 
an enterprise with more than one bulk storage establishment) engaged in 
the wholesale or bulk distribution of petroleum products if— 
(A) the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is less than 
$1,000,000 exclusive of excise taxes, 
(B) more than 75 per centum of such enterprise's annual dollar 
volume of sales is made within the State in which such enterprise is 
located, and 
(C) not more than 25 per centum of the annual dollar volume of sales 
of such enterprise is to customers who are engaged in the bulk 
distribution of such products for resale, and such employee receives 
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compensation for employment in excess of forty hours in any work-
week at a rate not less than one and one-half times the minimum 
wage rate applicable to him under section 6 [29 USCS § 206], and if 
such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of 
twelve hours in any workday, or for employment in excess of fifty-six 
hours in any workweek, as the case may be, at a rate not less than 
one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(c) For a period or periods of not more than five workweeks in the 
aggregate in any calendar year, or seven workweeks in the aggregate in the 
case of an employer who dees not qualify for the exemption in subsection 
(d) of this section, any employer may employ any employee for a work-
week in excess of that specified in subsection (a) without paying the 
compensation for overtime employment prescribed in such subsection if 
such employee (1) is employed by such employer in an industry found by 
the Secretary to be of a seasonal nature, and (2) receives compensation for 
employment by such employer in excess of ten hours in any workday, or 
for employment by such employer in excess of forty-eight hours in any 
workweek, as the case may be, at a rate not less than one and one-half 
times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(d) For a period or periods of not more than five workweeks in the 
aggregate in any calendar year, or seven workweeks in the aggregate in the 
case of an employer who does not qualify for the exemption in subsection 
(c) of this section, any employer may employ any employee for a work-
week in excess of that specified in subsection (a) without paying the 
compensation for overtime employment prescribed in such subsection, if 
such employee— 
(1) is employed by such employer in an enterprise which is in an 
industry found by the Secretary— 
(A) to be characterized by marked annually recurring seasonal peaks 
of operation at the places of first marketing or first processing of 
agricultural or horticultural commodities from farms if such industry 
is engaged in the handling, packing, preparing, storing, first process-
ing, or canning of any perishable agricultural or horticultural com-
modities in their raw or natural state, or 
(B) to be of a seasonal nature and engaged in the handling, packing, 
storing, preparing, first processing, or canning of any perishable 
agricultural or horticultural commodities in their raw or natural state, 
and 
(2) receives compensation for employment by such employer in excess of 
ten hours in any workday, or for employment in excess of forty-eight 
hours in any workweek, as the case may be, at a rate not less than one 
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(e) As used in this section the "regular rate" at which an employee is 
employed shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment 
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paid to, or on behalf of, the employee, but shall not be deemed to 
include— 
(1) sums paid as gifts; payments in the nature of gifts made at Christmas 
time or on other special occasions, as a reward for service, the amounts 
of which are not measured by or dependent on hours worked, produc-
tion, or efficiency; 
(2) payments made for occasional periods when no work is performed 
due to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the employer to provide 
sufficient work, or other similar cause; reasonable payments for traveling 
expenses, or other expenses, incurred by an employee in the furtherance 
of his employer's interests and properly reimbursable by the employer; 
and other similar payments to an employee which are not made as 
compensation for his hours of employment; 
(3) Sums paid in recognition of services performed during a given period 
if either, (a) both the fact that payment is to be made and the amount of 
the payment are determined at the sole discretion of the employer at or 
near the end of the period and not pursuant to any prior contract, 
agreement, or promise causing the employee to expect such payments 
regularly; or (b) the payments are made pursuant to a bona fide profit-
sharing plan or trust or bona fide thrift or savings plan, meeting the 
requirements of the Administrator set forth in appropriate regulations 
which he shall issue, having due regard among other relevant factors, to 
the extent to which the amounts paid to the employee are determined 
without regard to hours of work, production, or efficiency; or (c) the 
payments are talent fees (as such talent fees are defined and delimited by 
regulations of the Administrator) paid to performers, including announc-
ers, on radio and television programs; 
(4) contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or third 
person pursuant to a bona fide plan for providing old-age, retirement, 
life, accident, or health insurance or similar benefits for employees; 
(5) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for certain 
hours worked by the employee in any day or workweek because such 
hours are hours worked in excess of eight in a day or in excess of the 
maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection (a) 
or in excess of the employee's normal working hours or regular working 
hours, as the case may be; 
(6) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for work by 
the employee on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or regular days of rest, 
or on the sixth or seventh day of the workweek, where such premium 
rate is not less than one and one-half times the rate established in good 
faith for like work performed in nonovertime hours on other days; or 
(7) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid to the em-
ployee, in pursuance of an applicable employment contract or collective-
bargaining agreement, for work outside of the hours established in good 
faith by the contract or agreement as the basic, normal, or regular 
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workday (not exceeding eight hours) or workweek (not exceeding the 
maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection (a) 
[2], where such premium rate is not less than one and one-half times the 
rate established in good faith by the contract or agreement for like work 
performed during such workday or workweek. 
(f) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by 
employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum 
workweek applicable to such employee under subsection (a) if such 
employee is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual contract, or 
pursuant to an agreement made as a result of collective bargaining by 
representatives of employees, if the duties of such employee necessitate 
irregular hours of work, and the contract or agreement (1) specifies a 
regular rate of pay of not less than the minimum hourly rate provided in 
subsection (a) or (b) of section 6 [29 USCS § 206(a) or (b)] (whichever may 
be applicable) and compensation at not less than one and one-half times 
such rate for all hours worked in excess of such maximum workweek, and 
(2) provides a weekly guaranty of pay for not more than sixty hours based 
on the rates so specified. 
(g) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by 
employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum 
workweek applicable to such employee under such subsection if, pursuant 
to an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and the 
employee before performance of the work, the amount paid to the em-
ployee for the number of hours worked by him in such workweek in excess 
of the maximum workweek applicable to such employee under such 
subsection— 
(1) in the case of an employee employed at piece rates, is computed at 
piece rates not less than one and one-half times the bona fide piece rates 
applicable to the same work when performed during nonovertime hours; 
or 
(2) in the case of an employee performing two or more kinds of work 
for which different hourly or piece rates have been established, is 
computed at rates not less than one and one-half times such bona fide 
rates applicable to the same work when performed during non-overtime 
hours; or 
(3) is computed at a rate not less than one and one-half times the rate 
established by such agreement or understanding as the basic rate to be 
used in computing overtime compensation thereunder: Provided, That 
the rate so established shall be authorized by regulation by the Adminis-
trator as being substantially equivalent to the average hourly earnings of 
the employee, exclusive of overtime premiums, in the particular work 
over a representative period of time; and if (i) the employee's average 
hourly earnings for the workweek exclusive of payments described in 
paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (e) are not less than the 
minimum hourly rate required by applicable law, and (ii) extra overtime 
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compensation is properly computed and paid on other forms of addi-
tional pay required to be included in computing the regular rate. 
(h) Extra compensation paid as described in paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) of 
subsection (e) shall be creditable toward overtime compensation payable 
pursuant to this section. 
(i) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by 
employing any employee at a retail or service establishment for a work-
week in excess of the applicable workweek specified therein, if (1) the 
regular rate of pay of such employee is in excess of one and one-half times 
the minimum hourly rate applicable to him under section 6 [29 USCS 
§ 206], and (2) more than half his compensation for a representative period 
(not less than one month) represents commissions on goods or services. In 
determining the proportion of compensation representing commissions, all 
earnings resulting from the application of a bona fide commission rate shall 
be deemed commissions on goods or services without regard to whether the 
computed commissions exceed the draw or guarantee. 
(j) No employer engaged in the operation of a hospital or an establishment 
which is an institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, 
or the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises shall be deemed 
to have violated subsection (a) if, pursuant to an agreement or understand-
ing arrived at between the employer and the employee before performance 
of the work, a work period of fourteen consecutive days is accepted in lieu 
of the workweek of seven consecutive days for purposes of overtime 
computation and if, for his employment in excess of eight hours in any 
workday and in excess of eighty hours in such fourteen-day period, the 
employee receives period, the employee receives compensation at a rate not 
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(k) No public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) with 
respect to the employment of any employee in fire protection activities or 
any employee in law enforcement activities (including security personnel in 
correctional institutions) if— 
(1) in a work period of 28 consecutive days the employee receives for 
tours of duty which in the aggregate exceed 240 hours; or 
(2) in the case of such an employee to whom a work period of at least 7 
but less than 28 days applies, in his work period the employee receives 
for tours of duty which in the aggregate exceed a number of hours 
which bears the same ratio to the number of consecutive days in his 
work period as 240 hours bears to 28 days, 
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular 
rate at which he is employed. 
(1) No employer shall employ any employee in domestic service in one or 
more households for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such 
employee receives compensation for such employment in accordance with 
subsection (a). 
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(m) For a period or periods of not more than fourteen workweeks in the 
aggregate in any calendar year, any employer may employ any employee 
for a workweek in excess of that specified in subsection (a) without paying 
the compensation for overtime employment prescribed in such subsection, 
if such employee— 
(1) is employed by such employer—• 
(A) to provide services (including stripping and grading) necessary 
and incidental to the sale at auction of green leaf tobacco of type 11, 
12, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 35, 36, or 37 (as such types are defined 
by the Secretary of Agriculture [see 30 CFR § 30.1 et seq.]), or in 
auction sale, buying, handling, stemming, redrying, packing, and 
storing of such tobacco, 
(B) in auction sale, buying, handling, sorting, grading, packing, or 
storing green leaf tobacco of type 32 (as such type is defined by the 
Secretary of Agriculture [see 30 CFR § 30.1 et seq.]), or 
(C) in auction sale, buying, handling, stripping, sorting, grading, 
sizing, packing, or stemming prior to packing, of perishable cigar leaf 
tobacco of type 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, or 62 (as 
such types are defined by the Secretary of Agriculture [see 30 CFR 
§ 30.1 et seq.]); and 
(2) receives for— 
(A) such employment by such employer which is in excess of ten 
hours in any workday, and 
(B) such employment by such employer which is in excess of forty-
eight hours in any workweek, 
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular 
rate at which he is employed. 
An employer who receives an exemption under this subsection shall not be 
eligible for any other exemption under this section. 
(n) In the case of an employee of an employer engaged in the business of 
operating a street, suburban or interurban electric railway, or local trolley 
or motorbus carrier (regardless of whether or not such railway or carrier is 
public or private or operated for profit or not for profit), in determining 
the hours of employment of such an employee to which the rate prescribed 
by subsection (a) applies there shall be excluded the hours such employee 
was employed in charter activities by such employer if (1) the employee's 
employment in such activities was pursuant to an_agreement or under-
standing with his employer arrived at before engaging in such employment, 
and (2) if employment in such activities is not part of such employee's 
regular employment. 
(June 25, 1938, c. 676, § 7, 52 Stat. 1063; Oct. 29, 1941, c. 461, 55 Stat. 
756; July 20, 1949, c. 352, § 1, 63 Stat. 446; Oct. 26, 1949, c. 736, §§ 7, 
16(f), 63 Stat. 912, 920; May 5, 1961, P. L. 87-30, § 6, 75 Stat. 69; Sept. 
23, 1966, P. L. 89-601, Title II, §§ 204(c), (d), 212(b), Title IV, §§ 401-
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§ 207. Maximum hours 
(aMb)(l), (2) [Unchanged] 
(b)(3)(A), (B) [Unchanged] 
(C) not more than 25 per centum of the annual dollar volume of sales of such 
enterprise is to customers who are engaged in the bulk distribution of such products 
for resale, 
and such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty hours in any 
work-week at a rate not less than one and one-half times the minimum wage rate 
applicable to him under section 6 [29 USCS § 206], 
and if such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of twelve hours in any 
workday, or for employment in excess of fifty-six hours in any workweek, as the case may be, 
at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(c) [Repealed] 
(d) [Repealed] 
(e), (0 [Unchanged] 
(g)(1), (2) [Unchanged] 
(3) is computed at a rate not less than one and one-half times the rate established by such 
agreement or understanding as the basic rate to be used in computing overtime compensa-
tion thereunder: 
Provided, That the rate so established shall be authorized by regulation by the Administrator 
as being substantially equivalent to the average hourly earnings of the employee, exclusive of 
overtime premiums, in the particular work over a representative period of time; and if (i) the 
employee's average hourly earnings for the workweek exclusive of payments described in 
paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (e) are not less than the minimum hourly rate 
required by applicable law, and (ii) extra overtime compensation is properly computed and 
paid on other forms of additional pay required to be included in computing the regular rate, 
(h), (i) [Unchanged] 
(j) No employer engaged in the operation of a hospital or an establishment which is an 
institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, or the mentally ill or defective 
who reside on the premises shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) if, pursuant to an 
agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and the employee before 
performance of the work, a work period of fourteen consecutive days is accepted in lieu of 
the workweek of seven consecutive days for purposes of overtime computation and if, for his 
employment in excess of eight hours in any workday and in excess of eighty hours in such 
fourteen-day period, the employee receives compensation at a rate not less than one and one-
half times the regular rate at which he is employed, 
(k) No public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) with respect to the 
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employment of any employee in fire protection activities or any employee in law enforcement 
activities (including security personnel in correctional institutions) if— 
(1) in a work period of 28 consecutive days the employee receives for tours of duty which 
in the aggregate exceed the lesser of (A) 216 hours, or (B) the average number of hours 
(as determined by the Secretary pursuant to section 6(c)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1974) [29 USCS §213 note] in tours of duty of employees engaged in 
such activities in work periods of 28 consecutive days in calendar year 1975; or 
(2) in the case of such an employee to whom a work period of at least 7 but less than 28 
days applies, in his work period the employee receives for tours of duty which in the 
aggregate exceed a number of hours which bears the same ratio to the number of 
consecutive days in his work period as 216 hours (or if lower, the number of hours 
referred to in clause (B) of paragraph (1)) bears to 28 days, 
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is 
employed. 
flMn) [Unchanged] 
(o)(l) Employees of a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an 
interstate governmental agency may receive, in accordance with this subsection and in lieu 
of overtime compensation, compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half 
hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required by this 
section. 
(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph (1) only— 
(A) pursuant to— 
(i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of 
understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representa-
tives of such employees; or 
(ii) in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i), an agreement or 
understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the perfor-
mance of the work; and 
(B) if the employee has not accrued compensatory time in excess of the limit applicable 
to the employee prescribed by paragraph (3). 
In the case of employees described in clause (A)(ii) hired prior to April 15, 1986, the 
regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, with respect to compensatory time off for such 
employees in lieu of the receipt of overtime compensation, shall constitute an agreement 
or understanding under such clause (A)(ii). Except as provided in the previous sentence, 
the provision of compensatory time off to such employees for hours worked after April 14, 
1986, shall be in accordance with this subsection. 
(3)(A) If the work of an employee for which compensatory time may be provided included 
work in a public safety activity, an emergency response activity, or a seasonal activity, 
the employee engaged in such work may accrue not more than 480 hours of 
compensatory time for hours worked after April 15, 1986. If such work was any other 
work, the employee engaged in such work may accrue not more than 240 hours of 
compensatory time for hours worked after April 15, 1986. Any such employee who, 
after April 15, 1986, has accrued 480 or 240 hours, as the case may be, of compensa-
tory time off shall, for additional overtime hours of work, be paid overtime compensa-
tion. 
(B) If compensation is paid to an employee for accrued compensatory time off, such 
compensation shall be paid at the regular rate earned by the employee at the time the 
employee receives such payment. 
(4) An employee who has accrued compensatory time off authorized to be provided under 
paragraph (1) shall, upon termination of employment, be paid for the unused compensa-
tory time at a rate of compensation not less than— 
(A) the average regular rate received by such employee during the last 3 years of the 
employee's employment, or 
(B) the final regular rate received by such employee, whichever is higher 
(5) An employee of a public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an 
interstate governmental agency— 
(A) who has accrued compensatory time off authorized to be provided under paragraph 
(1), and 
(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, shall be permitted by the 
employee's employer to use such time within a reasonable period after making the 
request if the use of the compensator} time does not unduly disrupt the operations of 
the public agency. 
(6) For purposes of this subsection— 
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(A) the term "overtime compensation" means the compensation required by subsection 
(a), and 
(B) the terms "compensatory time" and "compensatory time off' mean hours during 
which an employee is not working, which are not counted as hours worked during the 
applicable workweek or other work period for purposes of overtime compensation, and 
for which the employee is compensated at the employee's regular rate. 
(p)(l) If an individual who is employed by a State, political subdivision of a State, or an 
interstate governmental agency in fire protection or law enforcement activities (including 
activities of security personnel in correctional institutions) and who, solely at such 
individual's option, agrees to be employed on a special detail by a separate or independent 
employer in fire protection, law enforcement, or related activities, the hours such 
individual was employed by such separate and independent employer shall be excluded by 
the public agency employing such individual in the calculation of the hours for which the 
employee is entitled to overtime compensation under this section if the public agency— 
(A) requires that its employees engaged in fire protection, law enforcement, or security 
activities be hired by a separate and independent employer to perform the special 
detail, 
(B) facilitates the employment of such employees by a separate and independent 
employer, or 
(C) otherwise affects the condition of employment of such employees by a separate and 
independent employer. 
(2) If an employee of a public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or 
an interstate governmental agency undertakes, on an occasional or sporadic basis and 
solely at the employee's- option, part-time employment for the public agency which is in a 
different capacity from any capacity in which the employee is regularly employed with the 
public agency, the hours such employee was employed in performing the different 
employment shall be excluded by the public agency in the calculation of the hours for 
which the employee is entitled to overtime compensation under this section. 
(3) If an individual who is employed in any capacity by a public agency which is a State, 
political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency, agrees, with the 
approval of the public agency and solely at the option of such individual, to substitute 
during scheduled work hours for another individual who is employed by such agency in 
the same capacity, the hours such employee worked as a substitute shall be excluded by 
the public agency in the calculation of the hours for which the employee is entitled to 
overtime compensation under this section. 
(As amended Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, §§ 6(c)(1)(B), (C), (D), 19(d), (e), 88 Stat. 60, 66; 
Nov. 13, 1985, P. L. 99-150, §§ 2(a), 3(a), (b), (c)(1), 99 Stat. 787, 789.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1974. Act Apr. 8, 1974, in subsecs. (c) and (d), substituted, effective Jan. 1, 1976, "three 
workweeks" for "five workweeks" and "five workweeks" for "seven workweeks"; and 
in subsec. (k), effective Jan. 1, 1976, substituted "232 hours" for "240 hours" each place it 
occurs. 
Effective Dec. 31, 1976, subsecs. (c) and (d) are repealed; and effective Jan. 1, 1977, in 
subsec. (k) substituted "216 hours" for "232 hours". 
Effective January 1, 1978, in subsec. (k), substituted in paragraph (1) "exceed the lesser of 
(A) 216 hours, or (B) the average number of hours (as determined by, the Secretary 
pursuant to section 6(c)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974) in tours of 
duty of employees engaged in such activities in work periods of 28 consecutive days in 
calendar year 1975" for "exceed 216 hours", and in paragraph (2) "as 216 hours (or if 
lower, the number of hours referred to in clause (B) of paragraph (1)) bears to 28 days" 
for "as 216 hours bears to 28 days". 
1985. Act Nov. 13, 1985 (effective 4/15/86, as provided by § 6 of such act, which appears 
as 29 USCS § 203 note), added subsecs. (o) and (p). 
Effective dates: 
Section 19(d) of Act Apr. 8, 1974, provided that the substitution, in subsecs. (c) and (d), of 
"three workweeks" for "five workweeks" and "five workweeks" for "seven workweeks" 
should be effective Jan. 1, 1976. 
Section 6(c)(1)(B) of Act Apr. 8, 1974, provided that the substitution, in subsec.(k), of 
"232 hours" for "240 hours" each place it occurs should be effective Jan. 1, 1976. 
Act Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, § 19(e), 88 Stat. 66, provided: "(e) Effective December 31, 
1976, sections 7(c) and 7(d) are repealed." 
Act Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, § 6(c)(1)(C), 88 Stat. 60, provided: "(Q Effective January 
1, 1977, subsection (k) is amended by striking out "232 hours" each place it occurs and 
inserting in lieu thereof "216 hours". 
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§ 216. Penalties—Civil and criminal liability—Enforcement proce-
dure—Savings provision 
(a) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 15 
[29 USCS § 215] shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not 
more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or 
both. No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an 
offense committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense 
under this subsection. 
(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of 
this Act [29 USCS §§206 or 207] shall be liable to the employee or 
employees aflfected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their 
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional 
equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may 
be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any 
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more 
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees 
similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such 
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. The court in 
such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and 
costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring an action 
by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become 
a party plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a 
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complaint by the Secretary of Labor in an action under section 17 [29 
USCS §217] in which restraint is sought of any further delay in the 
payment of unpaid minimum wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime 
compensation, as the case may be, owing to such employee under section 6 
or section 7 of this Act [29 USCS §§ 206 or 207] by an employer liable 
therefor under the provisions of this subsection. 
(c) The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid 
minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any 
employee or employees under section 6 or 7 of this Act [29 USCS § 206 or 
207], and the agreement of any employee to accept such payment shall 
upon payment in full constitute a waiver by such employee of any right he 
may have under subsection (b) of this section to such unpaid minimum 
wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as 
liquidated damages. The Secretary may bring an action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of the unpaid minimum 
wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated 
damages. The right provided by subsection (b) to bring an action by or on 
behalf of any employee and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to 
any such action shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the 
Secretary in an action under this subsection in which a recovery is sought 
of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under sec-
tions 6 and 7 [29 USCS §§ 206 and 207] or liquidated or other damages 
provided by this subsection owing to such employee by an employer liable 
under the provisions of subsection (b), unless such action is dismissed 
without prejudice on motion of the Secretary. Any sums thus recovered by 
the Administrator [Secretary of Labor] on behalf of an employee pursuant 
to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and shall be 
paid, on order of the Administrator [Secretary of Labor], directly to the 
employee or employees affected. Any such sums not paid to an employee 
because of inability to do so within a period of three years shall be covered 
into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. In 
determining when an action is commenced by the Administrator [Secretary 
of Labor] under this subsection for the purposes of the statutes of 
limitations provided in section 6(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [29 
USCS § 255(a)], it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any 
individual claimant on the date when the complaint is filed if he is 
specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint, or if his name did 
not so appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is added as a 
party plaintiff in such action. 
(d) In any action or proceeding commenced prior to, on, or after the date 
of enactment of this subsection [Aug. 8, 1956], no employer shall be 
subject to any liability or punishment under this Act [29 USCS §§ 201-
216, 217-219] or the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [this section, 29 USCS 
§§251-262] on account of his failure to comply with any provision or 
provisions of such Acts (1) with respect to work heretofore or hereafter 
performed in a workplace to which the exemption in section 13(f) [29 
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USCS § 213(f)] is applicable, (2) with respect to work performed in Guam, 
the Canal Zone or Wake Island before the effective date of this amendment 
of subsection (d) [expiration of 90 days from Aug. 30, 1957], or (3) with 
respect to work performed in a possession named in section 6(a)(3) [29 
USCS § 206(a)(3)] at any time prior to the establishment by the Secretary, 
as provided therein, of a minimum wage rate applicable to such work. 
(e) Any person who violates the provisions of section 12 [29 USCS § 212], 
relating to child labor, or any regulation issued under that section, shall be 
subject to a civil penalty of not to exceed $1,000 for each such violation. In 
determining the amount of such penalty, the appropriateness of such 
penalty to the size of the business of the person charged and the gravity of 
the violation shall be considered. The amount of such penalty, when finally 
determined, may be— 
(1) deducted from any sums owing by the United States to the person 
charged; 
(2) recovered in a civil action brought by the Secretary in any court of 
competent jurisdiction, in which litigation the Secretary shall be repre-
sented by the Solicitor of Labor; or 
(3) ordered by the court, in an action brought for a violation of section 
15(a)(4) [29 USCS § 215(a)(4)], to be paid to the Secretary. 
Any administrative determination by the Secretary of the amount of such 
penalty shall be final, unless within fifteen days after receipt of notice 
thereof by certified mail the person charged with the violation takes 
exception to the determination that the violations for which the penalty is 
imposed occurred, in which event final determination of the penalty shall 
be made in an administrative proceeding after opportunity for hearing in 
accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States Code, and regulations 
to be promulgated by the Secretary. Sums collected as penalties pursuant 
to this section shall be applied toward reimbursement of the costs of 
determining the violations and assessing and collecting such penalties, in 
accordance with the provisions of section 2 of an Act entitled "An Act to 
authorize the Department of Labor to make special statistical studies upon 
payment of the cost thereof, and for other purposes" (29 U.S.C.9a). 
(June 25, 1938, c. 676, § 16, 52 Stat. 1069; May 14, 1947, c. 52, Part IV, 
§ 5(a), 61 Stat. 87; Oct. 26, 1949, c. 736, § 14, 63 Stat. 919; Aug. 8, 1956, 
c. 1035, §4, 70 Stat. 1118; Aug. 30, 1957, P. L. 85-231, § 1(2), 71 Stat 
514; May 5, 1961, P. L. 87-30, § 12(a), 75 Stat. 74; Sept. 23, 1966, P. L. 
89-601, Title VI, § 601(a), 80 Stat. 844; Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, 
§§ 6(d)(1), 25(c), 26, 88 Stat. 61, 72, 73.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Explanatory notes: 
Bracketed words "Secretary of Labor" are inserted on authority of 
1950 Reorg. Plan No. 6, set out as transfer of functions note to 29 
USCS § 1. 
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Tel. & TeL Corp. (1980, CA5 La) 616 F2d 1342. Tel. & Tel. Corp. (1980, CA5 La) 616 F2d 1342. 
§ 216. Penalties—Civil and criminal liability—Enforcement procedure—Savings provisions 
(a) [Unchanged] 
(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act [29 USCS 
§§ 206 or 207] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their 
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in 
an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any employer who violates the provisions 
of section 15(a)(3) of this Act [29 USCS § 215(a)(3)] shall be liable for such legal or equitable 
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 15(a)(3) [29 USCS 
§ 215(a)(3)], including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the 
payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. An action to 
recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against 
any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent 
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and 
other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the 
court in which such action is brought. The court in such action shall, in addition to any 
judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by 
the defendant, and costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring an 
action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party 
plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of 
Labor in an action under section 17 [29 USCS § 217] in which (1) restraint is sought of any 
further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime 
compensation, as the case may be, owing to such employee under section 6 or section 7 of 
this Act [29 USCS §§ 206 or 207] by an employer liable therefor under the provisions of this 
subsection or (2) legal or equitable relief is sought as a result of alleged violations of section 
15(a)(3) [29 USCS § 215(a)(3)]. 
(c) The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or 
the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or employees under section 6 or 7 
of this Act [29 USCS § 206 or 207], and the agreement of any employee to accept such 
payment shall upon payment in full constitute a waiver by such employee of any right he 
may have under subsection (b) of this section to such unpaid minimum wages or unpaid 
overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. The Secretary 
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of the 
unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated 
damages. The right provided by subsection (b) to bring to recover the liability specified in the 
first sentence of such subsection and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such 
action shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary in an action under this 
subsection in which a recovery is sought of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime 
compensation under sections 6 and 7 [29 USCS §§ 206 and 207] or liquidated or other 
damages provided by this subsection owing to such employee by an employer liable under the 
provisions of subsection (b), unless such action is dismissed without prejudice on motion of 
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the Secretary. Any sums thus recovered by the Administrator [Secretary of Labor] on behalf 
of an employee pursuant to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and 
shall be paid, on order of the Administrator [Secretary of Labor], directly to the employee or 
employees affected. Any such sums not paid to an employee because of inability to do so 
within a period of three years shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States as 
miscellaneous receipts. In determining when an action is commenced by the Administrator 
[Secretary of Labor] under this subsection for the purposes of the statutes of limitations 
provided in section 6(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [29 USCS § 255(a)], it shall be 
considered to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant on the date when the 
complaint is filed if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint, or if his 
name did not so appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is added as a party 
plaintiff in such action, 
(d), (e) [Unchanged] 
(As amended Nov. 1, 1977, P. L. 95-151, § 10, 91 Stat. 1252.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1977. Act Nov. 1, 1977, (effective 1/1/78; see § 15(a) of such Act at 29 USCS § 203 note), 
in subsec. (b), inserted a new second sentence, beginning "Any employer who" and ending 
"as liquidated damages", in the new third, former second, sentence, substituted "An action 
to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences" for "Action to 
recover such liability, and in the last sentences, inserted "(1)", and added "or (2) legal or 
equitable relief in sought as a result of alleged violations of section 15(a)(3)."; and, in 
subsec. (c), in the third sentence, substituted "to recover the liability specified in the first 
sentence of such subsection" for "an action by or on behalf of any employee". 
Transfer of functions: 
Section 1 of 1978 Reorg. Plan No. 1 of Feb. 23, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807, provided: 
"Transfer of Equal Pay Enforcement Functions 
"All functions related to enforcing or administering Section 6(d) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, as amended, (29 U.S.C. 206(d) [29 USCS § 206(d)]) are hereby transferred 
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such functions include, but shall not 
be limited to, the functions relating to equal pay administration and enforcement now 
vested in the Secretary of Labor, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor, and the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Sections 4(d)(1); 4(f); 
9; 11 (a), (b), and (c); 16 (b) and (c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 
(29 U.S.C. 204(d)(1); 204(0; 209; 211 (a), (b), and (c); 216 (b) and (c) and 217 [29 USCS 
§§ 204(d)(1), (0, 209, 211(aHc), this section, 217]), and Section 10(b)(1) of the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947, as amended, (29 U.S.C 259) [29 USCS § 259(b)(1)]).". 
Other provisions: 
Liability and deferred payment. Act Nov. 13, 1985, P. L. 99-150, § 2(c)(1), 99 Stat. 788, 
effective April 15, 1986, as provided by § 6 of such Act, which appears as 29 USCS § 203 
note, provides: "No State, political subdivision of a State, or interstate governmental 
agency shall be liable under section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [this 
section] for a violation of section 6 (in the case of a territory or possession of the United 
States), 7, or 11(c) [29 USCS §§206, 207 or 211(c)] (as it relates to section 7 [29 USCS 
207]) of such Act occurring before April 15, 1986, with respect to any employee of the 
State, political subdivision, or agency who would not have been covered by such Act under 
the Secretary of Labor's special enforcement policy on January 1, 1985, and published in 
sections 775.2 and 775.4 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.". 
Effect of 1985 amendments. Act Nov. 13, 1985, P. L. 99-150, §7, 99 Stat. 791, effective 
April 15, 1986, as provided by § 6 of such act, which appears as 29 USCS §203 note, 
provides: "The amendments made by this Act [adding this note and 29 USCS §§ 201 and 
215 notes and amending 29 USCS §§ 203, 207 and 211] shall not affect whether a public 
agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental 
agency is liable under section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [this section] for 
a violation of section 6, 7, or 11 of such Act [29 USCS §§206, 207 or 211] occurring 
before April 15, 1986, with respect to any employee of such public agency who would have 
been covered by such Act under the Secretary of Labor's special enforcement policy on 
January 1, 1985, and published in section 775.3 of title 29 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.". 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
29 CFR Parts 579, 580. 
Add: 
29 CFR Parts 778, 1620. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
§ 260. Liquidated damages 
In any action commenced prior to or on or after the date of the enactment 
of this Act [May 14, 1947] to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid 
overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 USCS §§ 201-216, 217-219, 557], 
if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or 
omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had 
reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a 
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 USCS 
§§201-216, 217-219, 557], the court may, in its sound discretion, award 
no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the 
amount specified in section 16 of such Act [29 USCS § 216]. 
(May 14, 1947, c. 52, Part IV, § 11, 61 Stat 89; Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-
259, § 6(d)(2)(b), 88 Stat. 62.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1974. Act Apr. 8, 1974, deleted "(b)" following "section 16" in this 
section. 
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before any part thereof shall be paid. The person con-
testing shall be made a party defendant in any such 
action and shall have the right to contest such claim, 
and the prevailing party shall recover proper costs. 
1969 
34-26-4. "Wages" defined. 
Whenever used in this chapter, "wages" shall mean 
all amounts due the employee for labor or services, 
whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, 
task, piece, commission basis or other method of cal-
culating such amount. 1969 
CHAPTER 27 
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SUITS FOR WAGES 
Section 
34-27-1. Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs. 
34-27 1. Reasonab le amount — Taxed a s costs . 
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, ser-
vant, or other employee shall have cause to bring suit 
for wages earned and due according to the terms of 
his employment and shall establish by the decision of 
the court that the amount for which he has brought 
suit is justly due. and that a demand has been made 
in writing at least fifteen days before suit was 
brought for a sum not to exceed the amount so found 
due. then it shall be the duty of the court before 
which the case shai) he tried to aUow to the plaintiff'a 
reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount 
found dur for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit. 1969 
CHAPTER 28 
PAYMENT OF WAGES 
Section 
34-28-1. Public and certain other employments 
excepted. 
34-28-2. Definitions. 
34-28-3. Regular paydays — Currency or nego-
tiable checks required — Deposit in 
financial institution — Statement of 
total deductions — Unlawful with-
holding or diversion of wages. 
34-28-4. Notice of paydays — Failure to notify a 
misdemeanor. 
34-28-5. Separation from payroll — Resignation 
— Cessation because of industrial dis-
pute. 
34-28-6. Dispute over wages — Notice and pay-
ment. 
34-28-7. Payment at more frequent intervals per-
mitted — Agreements to contravene 
act prohibited. 
34-28-8. Subcontractors — Compliance with act. 
34-28-9 Enforcement of chapter. 
34-28-10. Employers' records — Inspection by 
commission. 
34-28-11. Commission may employ assistants. 
34-28-12. Violations — Misdemeanor. 
34-28-13. Assignment of wage claims — Powers of 
commission — Award of attorneys' 
fees. 
34-28-14. Actions by commission as assignee — 
Costs need not be advanced. 
34-28-15 to 34-28-18. Repealed. 
34-28-19. Retaliation prohibited — Resolution of 
cease and desist orders. 
34-28-1. Publ ic and cer ta in o the r employment s 
excepted. 
None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to 
the state, or to any county, incorporated city or town, 
or other political subdivision, or to employers and em-
ployees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticul-
tural or horticultural pursuits or to stock or poultry 
raising, or to household domestic service, or to any 
other employment where an agreement exists be-
tween employer and employee providing for different 
terms of payment, except the provisions of Section 
34-28-5 shall apply to employers or employees en-
gaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural, horti-
cultural or stock or poultry raising. 1973 
34-28-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) The word "employer includes every person, 
firm, partnership, association, corporation, receiver 
or other officer of a court of this state, and any 
agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned 
classes, employing any person in this state. 
(2) The word "wages" means all amounts due the 
employee for labor or services, whether the amount 
is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, com-
mission basis or other method of calculating such 
amount. 1969 
34-28-3. Regular paydays — Cur rency or nego-
tiable checks r equ i red — Deposit in fi-
nancial inst i tut ion — Sta tement of 
total deduc t ions — Unlawful withhold-
ing or divers ion of wages . 
(1) Employers shall pa\ the wages earned by the 
employee semimonthly or twice during each calendar 
month on days to be designated in advance by the 
employer as the regular payday. The employer shall 
pay for services rendered during each semimonthly 
period within ten days after the close of that period. If 
the semimonthly payday falls on a Saturday, Sunday, 
or legal holiday, payment ot wages earned during the 
semimonthly period shall be made on the day preced-
ing the Saturday. Sunday, or legal holiday If the em-
ployer hires employees on a yearly salary basis, the 
employer may pay the employee on a monthly basis 
by paying on or before the seventh of the month fol-
lowing the month for which services were rendered. 
All wages shall be paid in full to the employee in 
lawful money of the United States, or checks on 
banks convertible into cash on demand at full face 
value. 
(2) No person, firm, corporation, agent, or officer 
shall issue in payment of wages due or as an advance 
on wages to be earned for services performed or to be 
performed within this state any order, check or draft 
unless it is negotiable and payable in cash, on de-
mand, without discount, at a bank, the name and 
address of which must appear on the instrument. 
(3) If an employee voluntarily authorizes an em-
ployer to deposit wages due. or an advance on wages 
to be earned, in a bank, savings and loan association, 
credit union or other financial institution, the em-
ployer may so deposit until the authorization is ter-
minated. 
(4) If any deduction is made from the wages paid, 
the employer shall, either semimonthly or monthly at 
the employer's option, furnish the employee with a 
statement showing the total amount of each deduc-
tion. 
(5) It is unlawful lor an employer to withhold or 
divert part of an employee's wages unless the em-
ployer is required to withhold or divert the wages by 
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court order, state or federal law, or unless the em-
ployee expressly authorizes the deduction in writing, 
or the employer presents evidence which in the opin-
ion of the hearing officer or the administrative law 
judge would warrant an offset. 
(6) It is unlawful for an employer to require an 
employee to rebate, refund, offset, or return any part 
of the wage, salary, or compensation to be paid to the 
employee except as provided in Subsection (5). 
(7) An employer is not prohibited from pursuing 
legitimate claims of damages, offsets, or recoupments 
in a civil action against an employee. 1989 
34-28-4. Notice of paydays — Failure to notify a 
misdemeanor. 
(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to notify 
his employees at the time of hiring of the day and 
place of payment, of the rate of pay, and of any 
change with respect to any of these items prior to the 
time of the change. Alternatively, however, every em-
ployer shall have the option of giving such notifica-
tion by posting these facts and keeping them posted 
conspicuously at or near the place of work where such 
posted notice can be seen by each employee as he 
comes or goes to his place of work. 
(2) Failure to post and to keep posted any notice or 
failure to give notice as prescribed in this section 
shall be deemed a misdemeanor and punishable as 
SUCh. 1969 
34-28-5. Sepa ra t ion from payroll — Resignation 
— Cessat ion because of industrial dis-
pute. 
(1) (a) Whenever an employer separates an em-
ployee from his payroll the unpaid wages of the 
employee become due immediately, and the em-
ployer shall pay the wages to the employee 
within 24 hours of the time of separation at the 
specified place of payment. 
(b» This section does not apply to the earnings 
of a sales agent employed on a commission basis 
who has custody of accounts, money, or goods of 
his principal if the net amount due the agent is 
determined only after an audit or verification of 
sales, accounts, funds, or stocks. 
(2) In case of failure to pay wages due an employee 
within 24 hours of written demand, the wages of the 
employee shall continue from the date of demand 
until paid, but in no event to exceed 60 days, at the 
same rate which the employee received at the time of 
separation. The employee may recover the penalty 
thus accruing to him in a civil action. This action 
must be commenced within 60 days from the date of 
separation. Any employee who has not made a writ-
ten demand for payment is not entitled to any penalty 
under this subsection. 
(3) If an employee does not have a written contract 
for a definite period and resigns his employment, the 
wages earned become due and payable not later than 
72 hours after the resignation, unless the employee 
gave 72 hours previous notice of his intention to re-
sign, in which case the employee shall receive his 
wages at the specified place of payment at the time of 
resignation. 
(4) If work ceases as the result of an industrial dis-
pute, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of this 
cessation become due and payable at the next regular 
payday, as provided in Section 34-28-3, including, 
without abatement or reduction, all amounts due all 
persons whose work has been suspended as a result of 
the industrial dispute, together with any deposit or 
other guaranty held by the employer for the faithful 
performance of the duties of the employment. 19^ 9 
34-28-6. Dispute over wages — Notice and pay-
ment. 
In case of a dispute over wages, the employer shall 
give written notice to the employee of the amount of 
wages which he concedes to be due and shall pay such 
amount without condition within the time set by this 
chapter; but acceptance by the employee of any such 
payment made shall not constitute a release as to the 
balance of his claim. i%9 
34-28-7. Payment at more frequent intervals 
permitted — Agreements to contra-
vene act prohibited. 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way 
limit or prohibit the payment of wages or compensa-
tion at more frequent intervals, or in greater 
amounts or in full when or before due, but no provi-
sions of this act can in any way be contravened or set 
aside by a mutual agreement 1969 
34-28-8. Subcontractors — Compliance with 
act. 
Whenever any person shall contract with another 
for the performance of work, then it shall be the duty 
of such person to provide in the contract that all 
wages earned pursuant to the contract shall be paid 
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and 
in the event that any wages earned under the con-
tract shall not be paid as required in this act, such 
person shall be civilly liable for all wages for work 
performed under such contract in the same manner 
as if the employees entitled to such wages were di-
rectly employed by such person. i9«9 
34-28-9. Enforcement of chap te r . 
(li (a> The Industrial Commission shall ensure 
compliance with this chapter, investigate any al-
leged violations of this chapter, and determine 
the validity of any claim for any violation of this 
chapter filed with it by an employee. 
(b) The amount of $50 constitutes the mini-
mum wage claim that the commission may ac-
cept. 
(c) The wage claim must be filed within one 
year of the date the wages were earned. 
(2) The Industrial Commission may assess against 
an employer who fails to pay an employee in accor-
dance with this chapter, a penalty of 5% of the unpaid 
wages owing to the employee which shall be assessed 
daily until paid for a period not to exceed 20 days. 
The Industrial Commission shall retain 50% of the 
money received from the penalty payments for the 
costs of administering this chapter, and the Indus-
trial Commission shall pay all such sums so received 
to the state treasurer. The remaining 50% shall be 
paid to the employee. 
(3) (a) An abstract of any final award may be filed 
in the office of the clerk of the district court of 
any county in the state. If so filed, it shall be 
docketed in the judgment docket of that district 
court. 
(b) The time of the receipt of the abstract shall 
be noted by the clerk and entered in the judg-
ment docket. 
(c) If filed and docketed, the award constitutes 
a lien from the time of the docketing upon the 
real property of the employer situated in the 
county for a period of eight years from the date of 
the award unless previously satisfied. 
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nal to the party conducting the deposition, and shall 
deliver copies to the other parties requesting the 
same The reporter shall then file a certificate with 
the clerk of the court certifying to whom the original 
and copies were delivered and the dates they were 
delivered Any party moving for the publication of a 
deposition shall provide the court with the original or 
copy in the party's possession at the time the motion 
to publish is made 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discov-
ery proceedings in accordance with this rule All dis-
covery proceedings shall be completed, including all 
responses thereto, and all depositions and other docu-
ments filed with the court no later than thirty (30) 
days before the date set for trial of the case The right 
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the 
court Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be presented to the judge as-
signed to the case upon notice to the other parties in 
the action In exercising its discretion, the court shall 
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for 
such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of 
the parties seeking such discovery, whether permit-
ting such discovery will prevent the case from going 
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to 
any party Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the 
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by 
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date 
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or 
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of 
the trial date 
Rule 4-503. R e q u e s t s for j u r y ins t ruc t ions . 
In tent : 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting 
and requesting jury instructions 
Applicabil i ty: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit 
Courts 
S t a t emen t of t he Rule : 
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented 
to the court 10 days prior to the scheduled trial date 
unless otherwise ordered by the court At the time of 
presentation to the court, a copy of the requested in-
structions shall be furnished to opposing counsel 
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing 
and state m full the instruction requested Each re-
quest shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the 
original and copies of which shall be free from red 
lines and firm names and shall be entitled 
"Instruction No. " 
The number of the request shall be written m lead 
pencil 
(3) If case citations are used in support of a re-
quested instruction, a t least one copy of the requested 
instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted 
without the citations Citations may be provided upon 
separate sheets attached to the particular instruction 
to which the citation applies 
Ru le 4-504. Written o r d e r s , j u d g m e n t s a n d de-
c rees . 
In ten t : 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting 
written orders, judgments, and decrees to the court 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not 
of record 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court counsel for the part\ 
or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen 
(15) days or within a shorter time as the court ma\ 
direct file with the court a proposed order judgment 
or decree in conformity with the ruling 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings judgments and 
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before 
being presented to the court for signature unless the 
court otherwise orders Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five (5) 
days after service 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall 
also be reduced to writing and presented to the court 
for signature within fifteen (15) days of the settle 
ment and dismissal 
(4) Upon entrv of judgment notice of such judg 
ment shall be served upon the opposing party and 
proof of such service shall be filed with the court All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, 
which are to be transmitted after signature by the 
judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes 
and pre-paid postage 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be pre-
pared m such a manner as to show whether they are 
entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the motion of 
counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall 
identify the attorneys of record in the cause or pro-
ceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is 
made 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments 
and decrees shall contain the address or the last 
known address of the judgment debtor and the social 
security number of the judgment debtor if known 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as 
separate documents and shall not include any mat-
ters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court Orders not constituting judgments or decrees 
may be made a part of the documents containing the 
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based 
(8) No orders judgments, or decrees based upon 
stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the stip-
ulation is in writing signed by the attorneys of record 
for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or 
the stipulation was made on the record 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a 
written obligation to pay money and a judgment has 
previously been rendered upon the same written obli-
gation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel shall attach 
to the new complaint a copy of all previous judgments 
based upon the same written obligation 
Ru le 4-505. Attorneys* fees affidavits. 
In ten t : 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format 
for affidavits in support of attorneys' fees 
A p p l i c a b i l i t y 
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees 
in the trial courts 
S t a t e m e n t of t h e Rule* 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' 
fees must set forth specifically the legal basis for the 
award, the nature of the work performed by the attor-
ney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim 
to judgment or the time spent in pursuing the matter 
to the stage for which attorneys' fees are claimed, and 
affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable 
legal services The affidavit must also separately 
state hours by persons other than attorneys, for time 
spent, work completed and hourly rate billed 
(2) If the fee arrangement with the client is other 
than at an hourly rate an affidavit of the client or 
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correspondence from the client shall be filed with the 
court setting forth the terms and conditions of the 
arrangement, whether a flat rate or contingent fee, or 
the percentage of funds recovered or dealt with. 
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a prin-
cipal sum which it is expected will require consider-
able additional work to collect, the following phrase 
may be included in the judgment after an award con-
sistent with the time spent to the point of default 
judgment, to cover additional fees incurred in pursuit 
of collection: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT 
THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE AUGMENT-
ED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EX-
PENDED IN COLLECTING SAID JUDG-
MENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE 
AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFI-
DAVIT." 
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be 
awarded except as they conform to the provisions of 
this rule. 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for 
withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and 
not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) An attorney may withdraw as counsel of record 
in all cases except where withdrawal would result in 
a delay of trial. In that case, an attorney may not 
withdraw without the approval of the court. 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of 
record, written notice of the withdrawal must be 
served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney 
and upon all other parties not in default and a certifi-
cate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial 
date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served 
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial 
date. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or sus-
pended or withdraws from the case or ceases to act as 
an attorney, opposing counsel must notify the unrep-
resented client of his/her responsibility to retain an-
other attorney or appear in person before opposing 
counsel can initiate further proceedings against the 
client. 
Rule 4-507. Disposition of funds on trustee's 
sale. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee 
affidavits of deposit and claimant petitions for adjudi-
cation of priority in trustee's sales. 
To establish a uniform procedure in determining 
the disposition of funds on trustee's sales. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the 
Court any proceeds from a trustee's sale in accor-
dance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the 
trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting 
forth the facts of the deposit and a list of all known 
claimants, including known addresses. The clerk 
shall notify the listed claimants within 10 days of 
receiving the affidavit of deposit. 
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adju-
dication of priority to these funds and request a hear-
ing before the court. The petitioner requesting the 
hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claim-
ants listed in the trustee's affidavit of deposit and any 
others known to the petitioner. All persons having or 
claiming an interest must appear and assert their 
claim or be barred thereafter. 
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the 
court will establish the priorities of the parties to the 
trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with the 
clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the 
disbursement of funds as determined. 
ARTICLE 6. 
CRIMINAL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-601. Victims and witnesses. 
Intent: 
To establish procedures which ensure that victims 
and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, re-
spect, courtesy, and sensitivity. 
To establish procedures which ensure that child 
victims and child witnesses of crime are treated with 
consideration for their age and maturity and in a 
manner that is the least traumatic, intrusive or in-
timidating. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the judiciary, prosecutors, 
defense counsel, and law enforcement and corrections 
personnel in all felony cases in and all misdemeanor 
cases where personal injury is sustained by the vic-
tim. This rule also applies to all individuals who have 
been subpoenaed or called to testify as witnesses in 
any criminal proceeding. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of the arraignment or preliminary 
hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, the prose-
cuting agency shall provide written verification to 
the court that all victims and witnesses have been 
informed of their responsibilities during the criminal 
proceedings and that those proceedings have been ex-
plained to them in a manner which is understand-
able, given the age and maturity of the victims and 
witnesses. 
(2) At the time of the arraignment or preliminary 
hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, the prose-
cuting agency shall provide written verification to 
the court that all victims and witnesses have been 
informed of their right to be free from threats, intimi-
dation and harm by anyone seeking to induce the 
victim or witness to testify falsely, withhold testi-
mony or information, avoid legal process, secure the 
dismissal of or prevent the filing of a criminal com-
plaint, indictment or information. At that time and 
where facilities are available, the prosecuting agency 
shall provide written verification to the court that the 
victims and witnesses have been informed of their 
right to a separate waiting area. 
(3) Unless otherwise waived in writing, the prose-
cuting agency shall provide notice to all victims of the 
date and time of scheduled hearings, trial and sen-
tencing and of their right to be present during those 
proceedings and any other public hearing unless they 
are subpoenaed to testify as a witness and the exclu-
sionary rule is invoked. 
(4) The informational rights of victims and wit-
nesses contained in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this 
rule are contingent upon their providing the prose-
cuting agency and court with their current telephone 
numbers and addresses. 
(5) The written verification filed with the magis-
trate shall be transferred with the case file to the 
